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ABSTRACT
The law of China and Vietnam has been often ignored or
marginalized in mainstream scholarship of comparative law. This is
due to three orientalist assumptions, namely: nihilism (lawlessness);
instrumentalism (law as a tool for political control without rule of law
qualities); and assimilationism (no distinctive legal systems). These
assumptions fail to capture the complexity of law in China and Vietnam
and fail to place it in a better positon in comparative law. This Article
argues that the exploration of the law of China and Vietnam can
substantively enrich comparative law scholarship, for the following
reasons: first, there are multiple layers of law throughout their legal
history, namely chthonic law, Confucian law, civil law, socialist law,
and global law; second, the two states have accommodated some forms
of the rule of law as a strategic response to the need to consolidate the
legitimacy of the socialist regimes; and third, there are distinctive legal
systems in these countries, namely the Confucian legal system and the
socialist legal system, which are separate from other traditional legal
systems (Islamic law, Hindu law, and Buddhist law) and other modern
legal systems (civil law and common law). This Article concludes that
the study of law in China and Vietnam can make important
contributions to: traditional comparative law (functionalism and
taxonomy of legal systems); post-modern comparative law (law and
ideology, law and politics, law and culture, law and society, and legal
pluralism); and global comparative law (legal transplants, global legal
diffusion, and law and development).
* Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Asian Legal Studies, National University of
Singapore Faculty of Law; PhD (The University of Hong Kong). I greatly appreciate the support
of the Centre for Asian Legal Studies. I am also thankful to the editors of the Fordham
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article aims to locate the law of China and Vietnam within
the general context of comparative law.1 A background introduction is
necessary. China and Vietnam are two Asian countries whose
populations (about 1.4 billion and 95 million respectively) make up
1. Its primary concern is not to compare law in China and Vietnam, although some
comparisons are occasionally made. For substantive comparison, see LEGAL REFORMS IN CHINA
AND VIETNAM: A COMPARISON OF ASIAN COMMUNIST REGIMES (John Gillespie & Albert H.Y.
Chen eds., 2010); ASIAN SOCIALISM AND LEGAL CHANGE: THE DYNAMICS OF VIETNAMESE
AND CHINESE REFORM (John Gillespie and Pip Nicholson, eds. 2005).
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approximately twenty percent of the world population.2 During their
millennia history, both countries were influenced by Confucianism, one
of the world’s major traditions of philosophy.3 The two countries are
among the five socialist/communist countries4 that survived the
collapse of the Soviet Union.5 After the Cold War, both countries have
implemented the so-called “socialist market economy”, leading to
China’s being second largest economy and Vietnam’s being the 47thlargest economy in the world measured by nominal gross domestic
product.6 Both China and Vietnam have actively integrated in the
global economy, including the joining of the World Trade
Organization.7 Accompanying economic reform is legal reform. The
two socialist countries have implemented the so-called “socialist rule
of law state,”8 leading to the development of sophisticated legal
systems, despite the international condemnations of violation of human
rights and the lacking of the rule of law.9

2. Countries in the world by population (2017), WORLDOMETERS, http://www.
worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country [https://perma.cc/DN5R-KWJU]
(last visited Oct. 4, 2017).
3. See generally, RETHINKING CONFUCIANISM: PAST AND PRESENT IN CHINA, JAPAN,
KOREA AND VIETNAM (Benjamin A. Elman, et al. eds., 2002).
4. International observers tend to describe these countries as “communist.” See eg., LEGAL
REFORMS IN CHINA AND VIETNAM, supra note 1. Meanwhile, these countries tend to identify
themselves as “socialist.” See for Vietnam Constitution, art. 2(1) (2013) (“The Socialist
Republic of Vietnam State is a social rule of law State . . . ”); XIANFA art. 1 (1982) (China)
(“The People’s Republic of China is a socialist state.”). In this Article, “communist” or
“socialist” regime is understood with same meaning to refer to the regime ruled by a communist
party.
5. The three others are Cuba, Laos, and North Korea. For the survival of the communist
regimes, see WHY COMMUNISM DID NOT COLLAPSE: UNDERSTANDING AUTHORITARIAN
REGIME RESILIENCE IN ASIA AND EUROPE (Martin K. Dimitrov ed. 2013).
6. For economic reform in China and Vietnam, see TRANSFORMING ASIAN SOCIALISM:
CHINA AND VIETNAM COMPARED (Anita Chan, Benedict J. Tria Kwekvliet, & Jonathan Unger,
eds. 1999); MARKET AND SOCIALISM: IN THE LIGHT OF THE EXPERIENCES OF CHINA AND
VIETNAM (Janos Kornai & Yingyi Qian eds., 2008).
7. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e
/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm] (last visited Oct. 4, 2017).
8. For China, see the roundtable on the future of China’s “rule according to law,” ASIAN
POLICY 20 (July 2015). For Vietnam, see John Gillespie, Changing Concepts of Socialist Law
in Vietnam, in ASIAN SOCIALISM AND LEGAL CHANGE: THE DYNAMICS OF VIETNAMESE AND
CHINESE REFORM 45 (John Gillespie and Pip Nicholson eds., 2005).
9. See e.g., China: Events of 2016, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2017/country-chapters/china-and-tibet [https://perma.cc/5PK2-6A2X] (last visited Oct.
29, 2017); Vietnam: Events of 2016, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2017/country-chapters/vietnam [https://perma.cc/W3B8-JV7X] (last visited Oct. 29,
2017).
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Unfortunately, law in China and Vietnam has been ignored or
marginalized in mainstream scholarship of comparative law,10 although
it has been extensively studied by county-experts and scholars of
comparative Asian legal studies.11 Comparative law literature has
focused mainly on modern legal systems of western developed
countries in North America and Europe.12 When it comes to Asia,
comparative law scholars are more concerned with the countries which
have similar institutional settings and level of development, such as
Japan.13 The neglect or marginalization of Chinese and Vietnamese law
in comparative law stems from, among other things, what is called
“legal orientalism”14 or the western conceptualization of law in the
Oriental societies like China and Vietnam. Legal orientalism has
generated at least three assumptions about law in China and Vietnam,
which can be called: nihilism, instrumentalism, and assimilationism.
The nihilist view is that such oriental societies like China (and by
extent Vietnam) were dominated by “oriental despotism”15 in which
law did not exist as the consequence of “the rule of man”.16 Even in
modern time, it has been also argued that the domination of the
communist regimes in these countries has resulted in the neglect of law,

10. See e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, PAOLO G. CAROZZA & COLIN B. PICKER,
COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS, AND CASES ON WESTERN LAW,
FOURTH EDITION (2014); RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES,
TEXTS, MATERIALS (1998). The law in China is sometime referred to in major comparative law
work. See e.g., PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 319-360 (2014); UGO
MATTEI, TEEMU RUSKOLA & ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES,
TEXT, MATERIALS (7th ed. 2009).
11. See e.g. Gillespie & Chen, eds., supra note 1.
12. MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW 35-37 (2014) (criticizing “the focus on western
countries” in comparative legal studies”).
13. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 2006), including one chapter on “development of comparative law in East
Asia”, which focuses on Japan). See also, JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, DAVID S. CLARK & JOHN
OWEN HALEY, COMPARATIVE LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION IN EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA (2010) (including one chapter on law
of East Asian countries, namely China, Korea, Japan, and Thailand).
14. For legal orientalism, see TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM: CHINA, THE
UNITED STATES AND MODERN LAW (2013); Carol G.S. Tan, On Law and Orientalism, 7 J.
COMP. L. 5 (2012).
15. See generally, KARL AUGUST WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF TOTAL POWER (1957).
16. Teemu Ruskola, Law Without Law, or Is “Chinese Law” an Oxymoron?, 11 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 655, 656 (2003).
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such the time of lawlessness during Mao era in China.17 If the subject
matter does not exist, there would be no study. Second, some may agree
that there are laws in modern China and Vietnam but hold the
instrumentalist view that the socialist states have promulgated law as a
tool for political control, exemplified what is called the rule by law
rather than the rule of law.18 When law in China and Vietnam is
considered lacking the rule of law qualities, it will be marginalized or
ignored in comparative law literature. Finally, assimilationists cannot
see distinctive legal systems in China and Vietnam separate from the
two dominant legal systems, namely civil law and common law. 19
Therefore, they have ignored or marginalized their law and focused on
the dominant civil law and common law.
The three above assumptions fail to capture the complexity of law
in China and Vietnam and fail to place it in a better positon in
comparative law. This Article argues that the exploration of the law of
China and Vietnam can substantively enrich comparative law
scholarship, for the following reasons: first, there are multiple layers of
law throughout their legal history, namely chthonic law, Confucian
law, civil law, socialist law, and global law; second, the two states have
accommodated some forms of the rule of law as a strategic response to
the need to consolidate the legitimacy of the socialist regimes; and
third, there are distinctive legal systems in these countries, namely the
Confucian legal system and the socialist legal system, which are
separate from other traditional legal systems (Islamic law, Hindu law,
and Buddhist law) and other modern legal systems (civil law and
common law). This Article concludes that the study of law in China
and Vietnam can make important contributions to: traditional
comparative law (functionalism and taxonomy of legal systems); postmodern comparative law (law and ideology, law and politics, law and
culture, law and society, and legal pluralism); and global comparative

17. Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics: China’s
Discourse for the Rule of Law and a Bitter Experience, 24 TEMP. INT’L & COMP.1, 12 (2010)
(“many regarded Mao’s era as the era of “lawlessness.’”).
18. Eric Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 43, 106 (2001)
(“The Chinese government seems to move strongly toward adopting the rule by law in the
instrumental, positive sense…”).
19. See e.g., the conflation of socialist law and civil law, John Quigley, Socialist Law and
the Civil Law Tradition, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 781, 808 (1989) (“Socialist law contains features
that distinguish it from the legal systems of other countries of the civil law family. But those
points of difference have not removed socialist law from the civil law tradition”).
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law (legal transplants, global legal diffusion, and law and
development).
This argument is pursued in four parts. Part I explores the multiple
layers of law in China and Vietnam. Part II will examine the partial
achievement of the rule of law in the two countries. Part III considers
the two distinctive legal systems. Part IV concludes with further
reflections on the possible contributions of exploration of law in China
and Vietnam to comparative law.
II. NIHILISM? MULTIPLE LAYERS OF LAW.
Different laws have existed throughout Chinese and Vietnamese
legal history, including: chthonic law, Confucian law, civil law,
socialist law, and global law. Currently although China and Vietnam
are socialist countries, their law does not exclusively include socialist
law as elements of other laws have still informed the complex situation
of legality. I propose the concept of “multiplayers of law” to understand
this complexity. This concept refers to the co-existence of different
legal ideas, rules, process, institutions, and cultures in one society.
Within this multiple legal framework, one legal system may be
dominant, but elements of other legal layers still exist in their complex
interactions.
A. Chthonic Law
Patrick Glenn usefully coins the term “chthonic law” to refer to
the law of indigenous people.20 This oldest forms of law exist in both
China and Vietnam. In China’s Shang dynasty (c. 1600 BC–c.
1046 BC), chthonic law embodies in the customary laws of the zu, “a
consanguineous group of people descended from a common
ancestor.”21 In his book Origins of Chinese Law, Yongping Liu argues
that “there were no unified customary law in Shang times, but there are
many sets of customary laws practiced by the different zu.”22 The
subsequent dynasty, the Zhou dynasty, codified a series of li (rituals)
in an attempt to “maintain the unity of the members of the Zhou Zu”,
but still “allowed the people of other zu to use their customary laws.”23

20.
21.
22.
23.

GLENN, supra note 10, at 60.
YONGPING LIU, ORIGINS OF CHINESE LAW 21 (1998).
Id. at 22.
Id.
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That means the Zhou’s law includes both the codified li and the
indigenous law.
Prior to the coming of the Chinese conquers in 111 BC, the
Vietnamese people lived according to their indigenous law. Ma Yuan,
a Chinese official, reported to the Han Emperor that “the law of the
Viet people” was different from the law of the Han dynasty in ten
points.24 There is no evidence indicating the existing of written law
prior to the Chinese domination. What Ma Yuan called “the law of the
Viet people” is indigenous law orally transmitted and memorized
throughout different generations of the Vietnamese people. One
example from the marriage law is the customary rule that when the
older brother dies, the younger brother will marry his sister-in-law,
which is stemmed from the matrilineal system of the indigenous
people.25 Chthonic law continues to exist throughout Vietnamese legal
evolution with different nuances and contents. During the Chinese
dependency period (111 BC- AD 905), the Chinese conquers continued
to allow the local people to live according to their indigenous law at the
village level. Successive independent dynasties in Vietnam also
allowed the existence of chthonic law at communal level. Notably,
during the independent period, chthonic law was written down. The
hương ước (village law) drafted around the 15th century is a written
mixture of Confucian moral norms and indigenous customs of the
villages.26 Under French colonialism (1887-1945), hương ước
continued to exist as the mixture of indigenous customs and colonial
policies for villages. The Communist government abolished the hương
ước but has allowed their revivals since 1998. Contemporary hương
ước are a mixture of indigenous customs and socialist policies for
communal communities.27 While the Kinh people, the Vietnamese
majority residing in North Vietnam have their hương ước, minority
groups in Western Highlands and Northwest of Vietnam have their own

24. PHAN HUY LÊ, ET AL., LỊCH SỬ VIỆT NAM, TẬP 1 [VIETNAMESE HISTORY, VOLUME
1] 217 (1991).
25. VŨ VĂN MẪU, CỔ LUẬT VIỆT NAM VÀ TƯ PHÁP SỬ DIỄN GIẢNG, QUYỀN THỨ NHẤT,
TẬP MỘT [VIETNAMESE TRADITIONAL LAW AND THE EXPLANATION OF PRIVATE LAW, BOOK
I, VOLUME 1] 129-132 (1975).
26. See generally, VŨ DUY MỀN, HƯƠNG ƯỚC CỔ ĐỒNG BẰNG BẮC BỘ [ANCIENT
VILLAGE CONTRACTS IN NORTH VIETNAM] (2010).
27. ĐÀO TRÍ ÚC ED., HƯƠNG ƯỚC TRONG QUÁ TRÌNH THỰC HIỆN DÂN CHỦ Ở NƯỚC TA
HIỆN NAY [COMMUNAL CONTRACTS IN THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING DEMOCRACY IN OUR
NATION TODAY] (2003).
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indigenous law with different names, such as Hịt khỏng (Thái), Phat
kđi (Êđê), Phat Ktuôi (M’nông), N’ri (Mạ).28
The Civil Code in Vietnam recognizes the applications of
customary law defined as “rules of conduct obvious to define rights and
obligations of persons in specific civil relations, forming and repeating
in a long time, recognized and applying generally in a region, race, or
a community or a field of civil.”29 That means indigenous law is a layer
in the Vietnamese multi-player legal system.
B. Confucian Law
I use the term “Confucian law” to refer to a distinctive legal
system that is drawn on fundamental ideas, concepts, and principles of
Confucianism. Confucianism is a Chinese school of thought created by
Confucius (551-479 BC) and developed by Mencius (372 – 289 BC)
and Xunzi (312–230 BC) during the late Spring and Autumn Period
(770-476 BC) and Warring States Period (475-221 BC) in the history
of China.30 Major Confucian work includes: The Four Books (The
Analects of Confucius, The Mencius, The Great Learning, and The
Doctrine of the Mean); Five Classics (the I Ching or Book of Changes,
the Shu Ching or Book of History, the Shih Ching or Book of Poetry),
the Yi Li or Book of Rites, and the Chunqiu or Spring and Autumn
Annals); and Xunzi’s writings.31 Confucianism is a tradition and a
philosophy about a good way of life, including a good way of
governing. Particularly, in response to the historical context of political
chaos, classical Confucians’ central concern is a good political order
which in their belief depends on personal cultivation of virtual values.
Confucian philosophy therefore develops different moral, political, and
legal ideas, concepts, and principles.

28. See generally, NGÔ ĐỨC THỊNH, LUẬT TỤC TRONG ĐỜI SỐNG CÁC TỘC NGƯỜI Ở
VIỆT NAM [CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE LIVES OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN VIETNAM] (2010). See also,
David Lempert, Ethnic Communities and Legal Pluralism: The Politics of Legal Argument in
Market-Oriented Communist Vietnam, 25 LEGAL STUD. F. 539 (2001).
29. Civil Code, No. 91/2015/QH13, art. 5 (Nov. 24, 2015) (Viet.).
30. See generally, XINZHONG YAO, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONFUCIANISM (2000).
31. THE FOUR BOOKS: CONFUCIAN ANALECTS, THE GREAT LEARNING, THE DOCTRINE
OF THE MEAN, AND THE WORKS OF MENCIUS (James Legge, trans., 1945); MICHAEL NYLAN,
THE FIVE “CONFUCIAN” CLASSICS (2001); JOHN KNOBLOCK, TRANS. XUNZI: A TRANSLATION
AND STUDY OF THE COMPLETE WORKS (1988, 1990, 1994).

2017]

THE LAW OF CHINA AND VIETNAM

143

In Confucianism, ren (variously translated into English as “love”,
“perfect virtue”, benevolence”, or “humaneness32) is the central
concept foundational to the rest moral, political, and legal discourses.
The term is not clearly defined in Confucian work, which leads to
different scholarly explanations.33 I define ren as the love of others or
the concern for others, the distinctive characteristic of the socialized
human, distinguishing human being from other beings.34 On the ground
of the central concept of ren, Confucianism develops different moral
norms regarding the concerns for others in different social
relationships, such as xiao (filial piety), ti (fraternal submission), and
zhong (loyalty).
Ren is also the foundation for the governmental and legal
concepts: zheng ming (rectification of names) or the consistence
between the governmental tittles and the expected virtues and
functions; minben (people as basis) or the government working for the
public good; and li which comprehensively includes “rituals,
institutions, social and moral norms, which regulate all dimensions of
the peoples’ lives, ranging from personal behavior, familial
relationships, to socio-political functions and structures.”35
Particularly, li is an important concept in Confucian legal theory.36 Ren
is the moral foundation of li. Therefore, “in order to comply with Li, it
was essential to possess morals such as filial submission, brotherliness,
righteousness, good faith, and loyalty, basic norms of of virtue.”37
From the Han dynasty (221 B.C.) to the fall of the Qing dynasty
(1911), the legal system in China was predominantly influenced by
Confucianism, and hence it can be called Confucian law, although it
was also influenced by Legalism, another Chinese school of thought
which underlines the use of law (particularly criminal law) as the
instrument of state control.38 The Confucian influence leads to the
characterization of “Confucianization of law” or “the incorporation of
32. In this study, I refer to use the English term “humaneness”, which better captures the
meaning of ren.
33. See FUNG YU-LAN, A HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY VOL. 1 70 (Derk Bodde
trans. 1952); TU WEI-MING, THE CREATIVE TENSION BETWEEN JEN AND LI, 18 PHILOSOPHY E.
W. 34 (1968).
34. BUI NGOC SON, CONFUCIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EAST ASIA 35 (2016).
35. Id. at 52.
36. DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 51 (1973).
37. Zhang, supra note 17, at 12.
38. For legalism, see Eirik Lang Harris, Legalism: Introducing a Concept and Analyzing
Aspects of Han Fei’s Political Philosophy, 9 PHILOSOPHY COMPASS 155 (2014).
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the spirit and sometimes of the actual provisions of the Confucian li
into the legal codes.”39 One of the most important legal codes in
imperial China is the Tang Code, which “laid a foundation of the
traditional Chinese legal system.”40 According to Mo Zhang, “many in
China regarded the whole Tang Code as an outward legal expression
of the Li not only because it was deeply rooted in the Li, but also
because it legalized the Li as the basic social norms of conduct.”41
Particularly, “the ten abominations”, the most serious offenses,
stipulated in the Code, “express what we have termed fundamental
Confucian morality.”42 For example, one of them is the lacking of filial
piety, which aims to protect the Confucian moral norm of xiao (filial
piety). Confucianism influenced on not only formal criminal codes but
also the practice of criminal law and criminal procedure. Norman P. Ho
demonstrates that officials of the Tang dynasty drew on not only the
Tang Code but also fundamental moral principles in Confucian
classical texts to decide cases.43 In addition to criminal law and
procedure, “constitutional law” and administrative law in imperial
China were also influenced by Confucianism.44 The creation of several
imperial institutions (such as the royal examination system, jingyan or
imperial lectures, and yushitai or censorate) was inspired by Confucian
principles of good government operated by well-educated and virtual
scholars.45
The Confucian legal culture has still influenced in contemporary
China. Mo Zhang indicates that the Confucian position of a benevolent
government working for the people “maintain its influence in the
country. For example, it is a commonly held belief in China that a good
39. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 36, at 29. Some refers to the “legalization of
Confucianism.” See Herbert H. P. Ma, The Legalization of Confucianism and its Impact on
Family Relationships, 65 WASH. U. L. Q. 667 (1987).
40. Zhang, supra note 17, at 10.
41. Id. at 13.
42. GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE LAW 57 (1996).
43. Norman P. Ho, Understanding Traditional Chinese Law in Practice: The
Implementation of Criminal Law in the Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD), 32 UCLA PACIFIC BASIN
L. J., 145, 163 (2015); Norman P. Ho, Confucian Jurisprudence in Practice: Pre-Tang Dynasty
Panwen (Written Legal Judgments), 22 PACIFIC RIM L. & POL. J. 49 (2013); Norman P. Ho,
Confucian Jurisprudence, Dworkin, and Hard Cases, 10 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. (forthcoming
2017).
44. Wm. Theodore de Bary, The ‘Constitutional Tradition’ in China 9 (7) J. CHINESE L.
7-8 (1995); Pierre-Étienne Will, Virtual Constitutionalism in the Late Ming Dynasty in
BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 261-274 (Stéphanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle
eds., 2009).
45. See generally, FRANKLIN W. HOUN, CHINESE POLITICAL TRADITIONS (1965).
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government is the source of a better life for the people, and the
traditional concept of a “parental officer,” whose job is to make
decisions for the people, remains intact in the minds of the public and
the government.”46 Another example is that the Confucian virtue of
filial piety becomes a legal duty in today’s China: the revised law called
“Protection of the Rights and Interests of Elderly People” requires adult
children to visit their aging parents regularly.47 The first case was heard
by the People’s Court of Beitang District, Wuxi City in east China’s
Jiangsu Province.48 “The court ruled in favor of the 77-year-old
plaintiff, surnamed Chu, who sued her daughter for neglecting her.”49
Citing the above law, the court ordered that Chu’s daughter and sonin-law must visit Chu every two months and “at least three times during
major traditional holidays.”50
Confucian law was transplanted from China into Vietnam. During
the Chinese dependency period, the colonists introduced Confucianism
and Confucian law, but the local people largely lived under their
indigenous law, which was tolerated by the invaders. Early
independent dynasties, such as the Tran and the Ly dynasties, have
some policies to develop Confucianism and Confucian law, but it was
not until 15th century under the rule of the Le Dynasty that
Confucianism became official ideology of the imperial government and
Confucian law was well developed with the enactment of the Quốc
triều Hình luật (the Penal Code of the Royal Court), informally called
Luật Hồng Đức (Hồng Đức Code).51 Despite its name, the code covers
different areas from criminal law to civil law. The Tang Code of China
was the model of the Hồng Đức Code. Yet, the Le Code is the
consequence of both legal transplants and indigenization. The Le Code
was more influenced by the Tang Code on criminal matters, but on civil
law issues (such as contracts, torts, property, inheritance, and
matrimonial property), it was more reflective of Vietnamese
46. ZHANG, supra note 17, at 41.
47. Edward Wong, A Chinese Virtue Is Now the Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/03/world/asia/filial-piety-once-a-virtue-in-china-is-now-thelaw.html.
48. First Elderly Care Case Heard After Law Amendment, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (July
3, 2013), http://en.people.cn/90882/8308378.html [https://perma.cc/RM98-RZEE] (archived
Oct. 4, 2017).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See generally, NGUYEN NGOC HUY & TA VAN TAI, THE LE CODE: LAW IN
TRADITIONAL VIETNAM: A COMPARATIVE SINO-VIETNAMESE LEGAL STUDY WITH
HISTORICAL-JURIDICAL ANALYSIS AND ANNOTATIONS (1987).
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indigenous customs and social reality.52 Different from the Le dynasty,
the Nguyen dynasty (1802-1945), the last dynasty in Vietnam, enacted
the Hoàng Việt Luật Lệ or the Gia Long Code in 1815, loyally
mirroring China’s Qing Code. This code was also enforced during the
French colonial period.53 In addition to legal codes, the imperial
government in Vietnam also created several institutions inspired by
Confucianism, such as royal examination system, jingyan or imperial
lectures, and yushitai or censorate.54
The legal system in imperial Vietnam is comprised of not only the
above comprehensive legal codes but also many other more specific
legal codes and imperial regulations, including:


Thiên Nam Dư Hạ Tập (1483) (Volume of the Leisure of
the Southern Heaven), a collection of imperial
regulations on different specific issues;



Hồng Đức Thiện Chính Thư (1541-1560?) (Hồng Đức’s
Book on Good Governance), a collection of imperial
regulations on civil law issues, mainly property and
family law;



Quốc Triều Chiếu Lệnh Thiện Chính (1705-1729) (The
Dynasty’s Promulgations and Orders on Good
Governance), a collection of imperial proclamations and
orders on different specific issues;



Quốc Triều Khám Tụng Điều Lệnh ((1705-1729) (The
Dynasty’s Promulgations on Litigation), a collection of
imperial promulgations on civil and criminal procedures;



Lê Triều Hội Điển (unknown date) (The Lê Dynasty’s
United Regulations), a book on the administrations of six
ministries (revenue, personnel, defense, justice, public
works, and rites);



Từ tụng Điều Lệ (1468) (Regulations on Litigation), a
collection of imperial regulations on civil and criminal
procedures;

52. Ta Van Tai, Vietnam’s Code of the Lê Dynasty (1428-1788), 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 527
(1982).
53. PHAM DUY NGHIA, VIETNAMESE BUSINESS LAW IN TRANSITION 31 (2002).
54. For more details, see Bui Ngoc Son, Confucian Constitutionalism in Imperial Vietnam,
8 NAT’L TAIWAN UNIV. L. REV. 373 (2013).
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Nhân mạng Tra nghiệm Pháp (1737) (Methods of
Forensic Autopsy), a collection official instructions on
forensic autopsy; and



Quốc Triều Hồng Đức Niên Gian Chư Cung Thể Thức
(1470-1497) (Hồng Đức Dynasty’s Formats For
Pleadings), a collection of official formats for drafting
legal documents filed with a mandarin’s office.55
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Unlike the comprehensive criminal codes, these legal texts focus
on civil law, administrative law, civil and criminal procedure, criminal
examination, and legal process, although they may also include
criminal penalties. They include not only legally enforceable norms but
also prescriptions of moral conducts and other instructions. Like the
above criminal codes, these legal texts are also influenced by
Confucian moral principles. An extensive examination of these legal
texts is beyond the scope of this study. It is, however, useful to give
some examples. The Hong Duc Book on Good Governance, the unique
book on civil law in imperial Vietnam, comprised many provisions
about familial issues, which are influenced by Confucianism. For
example, Article 36 in an imperial regulation collected in the Book
stipulates that: “To be a man, to teach and bring up virtuous father and
filial children are the foremost tasks. Parents must provide their
children with rice and clothes…Children must respect and support their
parents…”56 This Article tries to protect the Confucian norm of filial
piety. In the same regulation, Article 38 listed seven reasons for the
husband to divorce his wife: failing to have children; disregarding the
husband for his poverty; malignant disease; lasciviousness; failing to
respect parents; failing to live in harmony with sisters and brothers; and
stealing.57 This provision is closely connected to three among the sìzì
or four virtues in Confucianism, namely zhong (loyalty to the king),
xiao (filial piety), jie (faithfulness), and yi (righteousness).58
Vestiges of Confucian law still remain even under the
contemporary communist rule in Vietnam. To illustrate, the first
sentence of the preamble to the Constitution restates the tradition of
55. These texts are published in modern Vietnamese language. See VIỆN NGHIÊN CỨU
HÁN NÔM, ĐIỂN CHẾ VÀ PHÁP LUẬT VIỆT NAM THỜI TRUNG ĐẠI [INSTITUTIONS AND LAWS
IN VIETNAM IN THE MEDIEVAL ERA] (2011).
56. VIỆN NGHIÊN CỨU HÁN NÔM, 1 ĐIỂN CHẾ VÀ PHÁP LUẬT VIỆT NAM THỜI TRUNG
ĐẠI, [INSTITUTIONS AND LAWS IN VIETNAM IN THE MIDDLE PERIOD] 456 (2011).
57. Id.
58. For more details on these Confucian virtues, see CHUN SHAN, Major Aspects of
Chinese Religion and Philosophy: Dao of Inner Saint and Outer King 223 (2012).
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nhân nghĩa (humaneness-righteousness).59 In addition, as a
constitutional culture, the Vietnamese communist leaders have been
influenced by both socialist values and Confucian beliefs “that value
virtue-rule more highly than strict conformity to legal rules and
processes.”60 The Criminal Code also protects some moral values
resonated with the Confucian ethics. For example, the Code includes
the offence called “Ill-treating or persecuting grand-parents, parents,
spouses, children, grandchildren and/or fosterers.”61 This provision
echoes the Confucian norm of filial piety. Another example in the Code
is Article 19 on “non-denunciation of crimes.” This Article stipulates
that the grand-father, grand-mother, father, mother, offspring,
grandchild, sibling, wife or husband of an offender, who fails to
denounce the latter’s crime, shall not bear penal liability unless in cases
of failing to denounce crimes against national security or particularly
serious crimes.62 This reminds another controversial aspect called zhi
(uprightness) in the Confucian norm of filial piety, which requires
upright son to “remonstrate his father against his wrongdoing, and the
best environment for the successful remonstration can be provided by
non-disclosure of his father’s wrongdoing.”63
Confucian influence is particularly evident in Vietnam’s family
64
law. Especially, the Confucian norm of filial piety remains a strong
influence. 65 To illustrate, the Law on Family and Marriage provides
that: “Children have the obligations and rights to care for and support
their parents, especially when their parents fall sick, become senile or
59. HIẾN PHÁP [CONSTITUTION], pmbl. (2013) (Viet.).
60. John Gillespie, Understanding Legality in Vietnam, in VIETNAM'S NEW ORDER:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE STATE AND REFORM IN VIETNAM 137, 145 (Stéphanie
Balme & Mark Sidel eds., 2007).
61. Criminal Code, No. 100/2015/QH13, art. 185 (Nov. 27, 2015) (Viet.).
62. Id. art. 19.
63. Huang Yong, Why an Upright Son Does Not Disclose His Father Stealing a Sheep: A
Neglected Aspect of the Confucian Conception of Filial Piety?, 5 ASIAN STUDIES 15 (2017).
64. Thomas J. Walsh, The Law of the Family in Vietnam: Assessing the Marriage and
Family Law of Vietnam, 42 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 61 (2011).
65. See generally, Kiều Anh Vũ, Chữ “Hiếu” Trong Cổ Luật Và Luật Thực Định [“Filial
Piety” in Ancient and Contemporary Law], KIỀU ANH VŨ (Nov. 2, 2011), https://kieuanhvu.
wordpress.com/2014/11/02/chu-hieu-trong-co-luat-va-luat-thuc-dinh [https://perma.cc/Q95QQBUX] (archived Oct. 29, 2017); Ngô Thị Minh Hằng, Chữ Hiếu Trong Nho Giáo Và Ảnh
Hưởng Của Nó Đến Pháp Luật Việt Nam Xưa Và Nay [Filial Piety in Confucianism and Its
influence in Vietnamese Law Then and Now], TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC LUẬT TP. HỒ CHÍ MINH (June
25, 2014), http://www.hcmulaw.edu.vn/hcmulaw/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=10361:s-kcb-nckh&catid=309:s-kcb-nckh&Itemid=357 [https://perma.cc/4H4M3GG5] (archived Oct. 29, 2017).
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disabled.”66 The Law also requires that: “Adult children who no longer
live with their parents are obliged to support their parents who have no
working capacity and no property to support themselves.”67 In addition,
the Law stipulates that the following agencies and organizations have
the right, as prescribed by the civil procedures legislation, to request
the Court to force the people who fail to voluntarily perform their
supporting obligation to perform such obligation: relatives,
administrative bodies on family and children, women’s unions, and
“other individuals, agencies and organizations.”68 Also, the Law on the
Elderly People underlines the children’s duty to offer financial support
to their parents and grandparents.69 Mass media has disseminated many
facts about the elderly parents being neglected by their children,70 but
there is no any case in which parents sue their children for being
neglected. This context of non-litigation may connect to moral
considerations.
Several important factors shape the continuing influence of
Confucian legal culture in Vietnam. One factor concerns Ho Chi Minh,
the father of modern Vietnam and the founder of the Communist Party
of Vietnam, who has played the influential role even in today’s
Vietnam. Different from Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh is an advocate of
Confucian moral values and principles.71 Second, modern Vietnam
does not witness radical movements against Confucianism, like
China’s May Four Movement and Cultural Revolution Movement.
These factors enable the continuing influence of Confucian legal
culture in contemporary Vietnam. However, the recent rising antiChinese nationalist movement72 in Vietnam as the consequence of the
conflict between China and Vietnam over the islands may inhibit the
direct reference to Confucian values in legal discourse and practice. In
this context, the influence of Confucian legal culture may happen at
unconscious level: people may not be aware of the Confucian origins
66. Law on Family and Marriage, No. 52/2014/QH13, art. 71 (Jun. 26, 2015) (Viet.).
67. Id. art. 111.
68. Id. art. 119.
69. Law on the Elderly, No. 39/2009/QH12, art. 10 (Nov. 23, 2009) (Viet.).
70. See e.g. Nguyễn Muội, Cụ bà bị con bỏ rơi giữa đường [A Female Elderly Abandoned
in the Street], BÁO ĐIỆN TỬ PHÁP LUẬT THÀNH PHỐ HỒ CHÍ MINH [HO CHI MINH CITY ELEC.
L. J.] (Oct. 7, 2013), http://plo.vn/xa-hoi/cu-ba-bi-con-bo-roi-giua-duong-314679.html
[https://perma.cc/L4T4-865C] (archived Oct. 29, 2017).
71. See Bui Ngoc Son, The Confucian Foundations of Ho Chi Minh’s Vision of
Government, 46 J. ORIENTAL STUD. 35, 41 (2013).
72. Nhung T. Bui, Managing Anti-China Nationalism in Vietnam: Evidence from the
Media During the 2014 Oil Rig Crisis, 30 PAC. REV. 169 (2017).
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of certain norms and values that inform their legal behavior and
practice.
C. Civil Law
Entering the twentieth century, both China and Vietnam
transplanted ideas, norms, and institutions of the civil law tradition
from the western world as a response to the need to modernize the legal
system and the nation more generally so as to cope up with the
challenges posted by the western powers.
In his recent book, Michael H.K. Ng provides an extensive
account of the “Legal Transplantation in Early Twentieth-century
China.”73 Accordingly, in early 1900s, the Qing government initiated a
series of legal reforms.74 After the first Opium War (1839–42), China
was forced to sign treaties with Western industrial nations, which led
to the extraterritorial application of their western law and institutions
in the Chinese territory.75 Ng notes that “in an attempt to secure the
Western powers’ support to abolish extraterritoriality” most of the
proposals for legal reform were based on the western civil law model
and the Japanese model which had been in turn westernized.76 In the
course of legal reforms based on legal transplants, the Qing government
sent their legal experts to study law overseas (mainly in Europe) and
hired foreign legal experts (mainly from Japan) as consultants for its
legal reforms initiatives.77 Consequently, the Qing government enacted
many legal codes, which “were drafted largely on the base of German,
French, and Japanese templates.”78 Examples include the Provisional
Articles for Local Courts and the Court Organization Law, which
introduced important changes to the justice system, such as the
distinction of civil and criminal cases in trial procedures, or the
confirmation of courts as “separate[d] and specialized institution[s] for
hearing and adjudicating lawsuits.”79
The Qing dynasty also drafted the Civil Code, modelling after
German and Japanese law, but this law was not completed under the
73. MICHAEL H.K. NG, LEGAL TRANSPLANTATION IN EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY
CHINA (2014).
74. Id. at 2.
75. ZHANG, supra note 17, at 27.
76. NG, supra note 73, at 2.
77. Id. at 13.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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imperial regime.80 The Xinhai Revolution in 1911 overturned the Qing
dynasty and created the Republic of China. The republican government
resumed the law-making process, but the Code was also not enacted
due to “power struggles amongst warlords.”81 Eventually, the Civil
Code was enacted in 1930 under the Nationalist Government, drawn
mainly on the civil law tradition.82 As Mo Zhang explains, “In addition
to its civil law style of division between general principles and specific
provisions, the Code was replete with civil law concepts. For example,
Part III of the Code dealt with property rights, but it used the name of
‘Rights over Things.’ ‘Things’ is a term for property in civil law
countries.”83 Apart from the Civil Code, the Nationalist Government
also enacted five other major codes, which also “relied heavily on civil
law tradition, and contained many legal principles taken from Germany
and Japan.”84 These codes altogether constitutes the so-called “Code of
Six Laws” (Liu Fa Quan Shu).85
The Code of Six Laws presents “the complete reception of the
civil law tradition in China”,86 but this does not mean a complete break
with the past Confucian law. Zhang indicates that: “Despite the strong
influence of civil law tradition, mainly in the areas of legal philosophy
and jurisprudence, no clear cut distinction was ever made between
Chinese legal tradition and the contemporary legal system, especially
with respect to the deeply-rooted concept of Li.”87 In other words, civil
law is a modern legal layer superimposed upon the previous Confucian
legal layer. At another point, the later socialist regime abolished the
Code of Six Laws, but “the civil law feature was not diminished;
instead, it was actually carried over and strengthened in the modern
legal system of China.”88 That means civil law remains a legal layer in
the contemporary Chinese legal system.
Like China, civil law was also introduced in Vietnam from the
West. However, the difference is that the process of transplantation of
civil law in Vietnam was the consequence of French colonialism. The
French colonists enacted three separate civil codes in three Vietnamese
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

ZHANG, supra note 17, at 29.
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 33.
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regions: the Abbreviated Civil Code 1883 in Cochinchina (south), the
Civil Code Implements in the Vietnamese Courts in Tokin (north) 1983,
and the Central Vietnam Civil Code 1936 in Annam (centre).89 In
addition, the colonialist also enacted the Vietnamese Commercial Code
in 1942 and numerous regulations concerning civil and commercial law
issues.90 Moreover, the colonists “seconded French legal personnel
including judges, court officials, and lawyers to administer the
system.”91 French civil law’s influence on Vietnam has been
summarized in the following words:
The French heritage remains heavy in the entire legal system,
military and civilian. The older, more renowned lawyers and
judges are often found to be French educated, French and nonEnglish speaking. Professional works are often published in
French. The French trappings as well as institutions are adapted by
the Vietnamese, and these are superimposed over the Vietnamese
society without much change. The Code Napoleon influence is
naturally strong, and the civil code system, as distinguished from
the common law, is employed. Trial by jury is not employed, the
technique of cross-examination is severely limited, and the
authority of an examining magistrate is much enlarged as
compared with US or common law practice.92

French civil law continues to influence on Vietnam even after the
country regained independence from France. John Gillespie observes
that: “Vestiges of colonial legality lingered for over a decade after the
1946 Constitution declared Vietnam independent from French rule.”93
Even under the “Renovation” (Đổi mới) period since 1986, the first
Civil Code of the socialist regime firstly enacted in 1995 have several
provisions deriving from the colonial Civil Code of Annam, such as the
provisions on mortgages, pledges, and suretyship.94
It has been seen that civil law has been transplanted into China
and Vietnam in early twentieth century. However, the mechanisms of

89. Bui Xuan Hai, Vietnamese Company Law: The Development and Corporate
Governance Issues, 18 BOND L. REV. 22, 23 (2006).
90. PHAM, supra note 53, at 32.
91. John Gillespie, Understanding Legality in Vietnam, in VIETNAM’S NEW ORDER:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE STATE AND REFORM IN VIETNAM 140-41 (Stéphanie
Balme & Mark Sidel eds., 2007).
92. GEORGE S. PRUGH, LAW AT WAR VIETNAM 1964-1973, 21 (1975).
93. Gillespie, supra note 91, at 141.
94. John Gillespie, Transplanting Commercial Law Reform: Developing a ‘Rule of Law’
in Vietnam 162 (2006).
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legal transplants in the two countries are different. Civil law was
imposed in Vietnam through colonial power. Differently, although the
China was confronted with the western powers, it was not formally
colonized and therefore has freedom to choose which models of law to
borrow. Why is civil law rather than common law the referred model
for legal transplant in China? One may argue that this is because the
civil law is consistent with the Chinese legal tradition of codification
of legal norms. However, law in traditional China is also consistent
with the common law tradition. Confucian legal theory and Confucian
law focus on fundamental moral principles as the foundation of the
legal system, which is not different from common law. Moreover,
Confucian legal theory and Confucian law also underline the necessity
of following established traditional norms, which is consistent with the
common law’s concept and practice of precedents. In fact, the fact that
China transplanted civil law rather than common law is mainly because
civil law as a kind of positive law is transplantable in a short period of
time, while the development of common law relies on the natural
evolution over a long period of time.95 In early twentieth century, the
Chinese government needs to reform the legal system in a short time to
cope with the immediate challenges from the western powers, and the
transplantation of civil law can meet with this demand.
D. Socialist Law
1. Transplantation
In both China and Vietnam, the current legal system is dominated
by the layer of socialist law transplanted from the former Soviet Union.
Socialist law is associated with Marxist economic theory and soviet
law. Socialist law is defined by these concepts and principles: “socialist
legality” which underlines the use of law as an instrument for the state
to control the society and citizens’ strict and unanimous application of
law; “vanguardism” or the leading role of the communist party as the
single ruling party; “democratic centralism” or the rejection of the
separation of power in favour of the centralization of power into the
supreme “soviet” or the national assembly; the “public ownership” of
means of productions leading to the state’s controlling of the national
95. In fact, Alan Watson’s account of legal transplants also relies on the experience of civil
law. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d
ed. 1993).
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economy and national economic resources (including lands); and the
“citizens’ rights” granted (and withdrawn) by the state.96
After defeating the Nationalist Party of China and creating the
communist government, the People’s Republic of China, in 1949, the
Communist Party of China abolished the Six Codes and other laws of
the Nationalist Government.97 Zhang explains: “This abolition was part
of major effort to remove the capitalist influences and to establish a
new socialist legal system.”98 In the course of creating the socialist
legal system, the new communist government followed the Soviet legal
system. “Consequently, almost all laws and regulations promulgated in
the country in early 1950s, including the 1954 Constitution, evidenced
a clear Soviet influence.”99 During this period (1949-1957):
[a] massive project of Soviet assistance was launched, involving
‘roughly ten thousand’ Soviet advisors who came to teach in
China. The concept of a universal socialist legal system for new
communist states was a major area of collaboration in this ‘golden
age’ of Sino-Soviet cooperation. During this period, Chinese legal
education ‘was totally under the guidance of Soviet experts.’ A
survey of Russian-language Soviet literature on Chinese legal
development showed that Soviet and Chinese models were
converging at this point.100

However, the Cultural Revolution initiated by Mao Zedong
induced “legal anarchy”: law schools were shut down and formal laws
were absent.101 After Mao’s death, the development of law in China
revived. Particularly, the economic reform program called “reform and
opening-up” (gaige kaifang) led by Deng Xiaoping has resulted in the
enactment of numerous laws.102 “No matter the rhetoric, legal
reformers in Deng’s China had little choice but to lean heavily on the
institutions, texts, and ideas of the Soviet socialist model in the early

96. For features of socialist law, see generally The Common Law of Constitutions of the
Communist-Party States, 3 REV. SOC. L. 155 (1977); JOHN N. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND
THEIR LAW: A SEARCH FOR THE COMMON CORE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE MARXIAN
SOCIALIST STATES (1969).
97. ZHANG, supra note 17, at 32.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 33.
100. William Partlett & Eric C Ip, Is Socialist Law Really Dead? 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 463, 475-6 (2016).
101. ZHANG, supra note 17, at 18.
102. For legal reform in China after “reform and opening-up” program, see BIN LIANG,
THE CHANGING CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: 1978-PRESENT (2008).
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stages of restoring formal legality in the modern Chinese legal
system.”103
In 1997, the Communist Party of China decided to establish a
“socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics.”104 But the party’s
explanation of the “Chinese characteristics” “offers little meaningful
substance, but instead is simply a political slogan.”105 Zhang identifies
two “features” of the Chinese socialist legal system, namely the
leadership of the communist party and the socialist concept of public
ownership.106 However, these are the common features of the socialist
regimes rather than distinctive to China.
Like China, Vietnam also borrowed socialist law from the former
Soviet Union. This process began in the 1960s when the communist
government dominated North Vietnam.107 After national unification in
1974, socialist law was borrowed and applied throughout the country.
As the embodiment of the instrumentalist nature, socialist law
developed in Vietnam before the Renovation period was mainly public
law. The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
promulgated in December 1980, strictly adhered to the 1977
Constitution of the USSR, evident by the confirmations of the principle
of dictatorship of the proletariat, the exclusive leadership of the
Communist Party, the centrally planned economy, citizen’s duties and
statist rights, and the Leninist constitutional structure consisting of the
supreme National Assembly, the collective presidency called Council
of State, the subordinate government called Council of Ministers, the
procucracies, and the courts. 108
The Communist Party of Vietnam initiated an important economic
reform program known as Đổi mới (Renovation) in 1986, which was
meant to transform the centrally planned economy into the “socialistoriented market economy,” comparable to Deng’s gaige kaifang
program.109 The Renovation campaign allowed and stipulated certain
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Partlett & Ip, supra note 100, at 463, 479.
ZHANG, supra note 17, at 2.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 50-53.
See generally, PENELOPE NICHOLSON, BORROWING COURT SYSTEMS: THE
EXPERIENCE OF SOCIALIST VIETNAM (2007).
108. On the 1980 Constitution, see William J. Duiker, The Constitutional System of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, in CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY
ASIA (Lawrence W. Beer ed., 1992).
109. For comparison of economic reform in China and Vietnam, see TRANSFORMING
ASIAN SOCIALISM: CHINA AND VIETNAM COMPARED (Anita Chan et al. eds., 1999).
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degree of economic liberalization: decollectivization of agriculture,
private property, private companies, and foreign investments.110 To
meet the new demands of renovation of the nation, a new Constitution
was adopted in April 1992. It confirmed the concept of “socialistoriented market economy,” allowed the development of private
economic sectors, but basically remained the Leninist constitutional
structure with some minor changes.111
More recently, a new constitution was adopted in Vietnam in
2013, which introduces more human rights and some new concepts
(such as controlling the state power), but confirms fundamental
socialist features which reflect the soviet legal legacy. To illustrate, it
confirms the “socialist rule of law state” and class-based collective
mastery:
“The State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a socialist rule
of law state of the People, by the People and for the People. The
Socialist Republic of Vietnam is the country where the People are
the masters; all the state power belongs to the People and is based
on the alliance of the working class, the peasantry and the
intelligentsia.”112

It establishes the aspirations and goals to the socialist paradise: “[t]he
state guarantees and promotes the People’s mastery; acknowledges,
respects, protects and guarantees human rights and citizens’ rights;
implements the objectives of prosperous people, state powers,
democracy, justice, civilization, and all that people enjoy that is
abundant and free for a happy life with conditions for all-round
development.”113 It confirms the leadership of the Party over the state
and the society and “Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Ho Chi Minh
Thought” as its ideology.114 The Constitution confirms the principle of
democratic centralism: “The State . . . practices the principle of
democratic centralism.”115 It provides for statist rights: “Citizens’
rights are inseparable from citizens’ duties. Everyone has the duty to
respect the rights of others. Citizens are responsible to practice their
duties to the State and society. The practice of human rights and
110. See generally, SOCIOECONOMIC RENOVATION IN VIET NAM: THE ORIGIN,
EVOLUTION, AND IMPACT OF DOI MOI (Peter Boothroyd & Pham Xuam Nam eds., 2000).
111. See generally, Russell Heng Hiang Khng, The 1992 Revised Constitution of Vietnam:
Background and Scope of Changes, 14 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 221 (1992).
112. HIẾN PHÁP [CONSTITUTION], art. 2 (2013) (Viet.).
113. Id. art. 3.
114. Id. art. 4.
115. Id. art. 8.
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citizens’ rights cannot infringe national interests and legal and
legitimate rights and interests of others.”116 It stipulates the politicized
military: “The people’s armed forces shall show absolute loyalty to the
Fatherland, the People, the Party and the State”.117 It confirms that “The
Vietnamese economy is a socialist-oriented market economy with
multi-forms of ownership multi-sectors of economic structure; the state
economic sector plays the leading role.”118 It establishes the state
ownership of all lands.119 The Constitution also requires the People’s
Courts and the People’s Procuracies to safeguard the socialist regime,
among other things.120 Finally, it also establishes several social policies
in the direction towards to socialism:
“The State shall invest in the development of the protection and
care of the People’s health, provide health insurance for the entire
people and exercise a priority policy of health care for ethnic
minorities, highlanders, islanders and people living in extremely
difficult socio-economic conditions.”121

Further, “[t]he State shall create equal opportunities for citizens to
enjoy social welfare, develop a system of social security, and provide
a policy assisting the elderly, the disabled, the poor and people with
other difficult circumstances” poor people, and other disadvantaged
people” and “[t]he State and society shall provide a favourable
environment for the growth of the Vietnamese family which is
prosperous, progressive, and happy; create Vietnamese people who are
healthy, cultured, profoundly patriotic, unified, independent and
responsible.” 122
We have seen that socialist law has been transplanted from the
Soviet Union into China and Vietnam and has remained its influence
in the two countries nowadays. The process of transplantation of
socialist law in China and Vietnam is determined by the fact the two
countries were the members of the soviet camp. After the collapse of
the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam have remained the socialist
regime, which explains the continuity of not only the socialist political
structure but also socialist law.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. art. 15.
Id. art. 65.
Id. art. 51.
Id. art. 54.
Id. arts. 102, 107.
Id. art. 58.
Id. arts. 59, 60.
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2. Transformation

Since China and Vietnam introduced the economic reform
program, socialist law has been remained but experienced a significant
transformation, characterized by the enactment of a tone of formal law
regulating virtually all aspects of the society. Celebrating its
achievements in making formal law, the Chinese government said:
“Since New China was founded, and particularly since the policy
of reform and opening up was introduced in 1978, China has made
remarkable achievements in its legislation work. By the end of
August 2011, the Chinese legislature had enacted 240 effective
laws including the current Constitution, 706 administrative
regulations, and over 8,600 local regulations. As a result, all legal
branches have been set up, covering all aspects of social
relations.”123

To illustrate, consider the following details:


Laws for implementing the policy called “one country, two
systems”: The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, and the Basic Law of the Macao Special
Administrative Region.124



Laws for promoting socialist market economy: General
Principles of the Civil Law, Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned
by the Whole People, Law on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint
Ventures, Law on Foreign-funded Enterprises, Patent Law,
Trademark Law, Copyright Law, Economic Contract Law, Law
on Enterprise Bankruptcy, Company Law, Partnership Enterprise
Law, Law on Commercial Banks, Law on Township Enterprises,
Anti-Unfair Competition Law, Law on the Protection of
Consumers’ Rights and Interests, Product Quality Law, Auction
Law, Guaranty Law, Maritime Code, Insurance Law, Negotiable
Instruments Law, Law on Urban Real Estate Administration,
Advertising Law, Law on Certified Public Accountants,
Arbitration Law, Audit Law, Budget Law, Law on the People’s
Bank of China, Foreign Trade Law, and Labor Law.125

123. INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, The
Socialist System of Laws with Chinese Characteristics (2011) [hereinafter STATE COUNCIL
WHITE PAPER] http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cede/det/zt/zgzfbps/t872739.htm [https://perma.cc/
C9V6-D6MW] (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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Laws for joining the World Trade Organization (WTO):
Securities Law, Contract Law, Law on Bid Invitation and
Bidding, Trust Law, Law on Individual Proprietorship
Enterprises, Law on the Contracting of Rural Land, Government
Procurement Law; revisions of the Foreign Trade Law, Law on
Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, Law on Chinese-Foreign
Cooperative Joint Ventures, Law on Foreign-funded Enterprises,
Patent Law, Trademark Law, and Copyright Law.126



Laws for dealing with social, cultural, and environmental issues:
Higher Education Law, Law on Prevention and Control of
Occupational Diseases, Law on the Protection of Cultural Relics,
Environmental Protection Law, Law on the Prevention and
Control of Water Pollution, Law on the Prevention and Control
of Atmospheric Pollution, Marine Environmental Protection
Law, and Pharmaceuticals Administration Law, Social Insurance
Law, Labor Contract Law, Employment Promotion Law, Food
Safety Law, Law on Renewable Energy, Circular Economy
Promotion Law, and Law on Environmental Impact
Assessment.127



Laws for building state institutions: Law on Administrative
Penalty, Law on Legislation, Law on State Compensation,
Judges Law, Public Procurators Law, Law on the Supervision of
Standing Committees of People’s Congresses at All Levels,
Administrative Licensing Law, and Administrative Coercion
Law.128



Laws concerning justice, crimes, and procedures: Criminal Law,
Criminal Procedure Law, Civil Procedure Law, Administrative
Procedure Law, People’s Mediation Law, Law on Labor Dispute
Mediation and Arbitration, and Law on Lawyers.129
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Like China, Vietnam has developed a sophisticated system of
formal legal rules which cover almost every aspect of the society.
While formal law in China has been documented by other scholars,130
formal law in Vietnam has not yet been received sufficient academic
attention, and hence is examined in greater details in this section. Since
Vietnam launched the Renovation campaign in 1986, the party-state
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See LIANG, supra note 102; YUHUA WANG, TYING THE AUTOCRAT’S HANDS: THE
RISE OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 18 (2015).
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has had a serious concern of governance by formal law. To illustrate,
the post-Renovation Constitution enacted in 1992 stipulated in Article
12 that “The state shall govern the society through law.” In 2005, the
Politburo introduced the Resolution 48-NQ/TW on the Strategy to
Construct and Perfect the Vietnamese Legal System from Now to 2010
with a Vision to 2020 (hereinafter, 2005 Legal Reform Strategy).131 The
party believed that law has been developed during nearly two decades
of Renovation, but it is imperative to develop the legal system
comprehensively with a long-term plan. After ten years implementing
this strategy, on 04 April 2016, the Politburo issued the Conclusion
No.01-KL/TW on the continuous implementation of the strategy with
the detailed plan of legal reform from 2016 to 2020.132
Another indicator of the party-state’s serious concern of formal
law is the enactment of the law on making formal law. Formally called
as “Law on Enactment of Normative Legal Documents”, this law was
first enacted 1996 and replaced by subsequent versions in 2004, 2008,
and recently 2015. According to the current version, formal legal rules
are promulgated with different types of legal instruments and by
different legal institutions. The legal validity of these legal rules is
hierarchical. For example, “by-law” documents must conform to
legislations which are in turn under the Constitution- the supreme law
of the land. The law also provides for complex processes of lawmaking (not constitution-making which is provided in the Constitution
itself) and supervising the consistence among the legal instruments.
The Law on Enactment of Normative Legal Documents indicates the
party-state’s real grave concern on making formal legal rules and
structuring the sophisticated formal rule-making process.
Quantitatively, during the post-Renovation period, Vietnam has
enacted a tone of regulations. I relied on the online database of
Vietnamese law called Thư viện Pháp luật (Law Library)

131. Bộ Chính trị [Politburo], 48-NQ/TW, Nghị Quyết Về Chiến Lược Xây Dựng Và
Hoàn Thiện Hệ Thống Pháp Luật Việt Nam Từ Nay Đến Năm 2010, Định Hướng Đến Năm
2020 [Resolution On The Strategy To Construct And Perfect The Vietnamese Legal System
From Now To 2010 With A Vision To 2020”].
132. Bộ Chính trị [Politburo], Kết luận số 01-KL/TW, ngày 04/4/2016 của Bộ Chính trị
về việc tiếp tục thực hiện Nghị quyết số 48-NQ/TW của Bộ Chính trị khóa IX về Chiến lược
xây dựng và hoàn thiện hệ thống pháp luật Việt Nam đến năm 2010, định hướng đến năm 2020.
[Conclusion No. 01-KL/TW, dated 4 April 2016 on the Implementation of Resolution on the
Strategy to Construct and Perfect the Vietnamese Legal System from Now to 2010 With a Vision
to 2020].
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(http://thuvienphapluat.vn) to create figures in the Appendix.133 The
quantitative data was coded till 6 November 2016. The number of
regulations (154.507) enacted during around post-Renovation thirty
years (1987-2016) exceeds around 19 times those (8.029) enacted in
the previous fifty years (1936-1986).
Figure 1 demonstrates that the number of regulations have
remarkably increased over post-Renovation years. While there were
only 309 regulations in 1987, the number dramatically increased to
15.4507 by 6 November 2016. Particularly, in the 21st century when
the socialist market economy has been basically established and
Vietnam has gradually integrated into the world market, the country
has promulgated thousands of regulations.
Figure 3 indicates that formal laws have covered different areas
of society. The number of formal laws on the governing structure is
highest. Important laws for legal institution-building include the
Constitution and organic laws on major state branches. The
Constitution and these constitutional laws are revised and replaced
several times during the last three decades. The current Constitution
was enacted in late 2013, following the enactment of revision of
organic laws, including: Law on Organization of the National
Assembly (2014), Law on Organization of the Government (2015),
Law on Organization of the People’s Courts (2014), and Law on
Organization of the People’s Procucracies (2014). The implementation
of the Renovation policy requires formal legal framework for the
operation of the emerging market, which explains the huge amount of
formal laws for the market. Important legislative laws for the market
are enacted, revised, and replaced several times in the last three
decades. The current important laws for the market include: Civil Code
(2015), Enterprise Law (2014), Investment Law (2014), Real Estate
Business Law (2014), Securities Law (2006, amended 2011),
Intellectual Property Law (2005, amended 2009), Law on the State
Bank of Vietnam (2010), Law on Finance (2005), Competition Law
(2005), Bankruptcy Law (2014), Law on Commercial Arbitration
(2010), and Corporative Law (2012), Labor Code (2012), and Land
Law (2016). Economic transformation also creates a number of social,
cultural, and environmental problems, which explains the high
numbers of formal laws enacted to deal with these. Important current
133. See the Appendix of this Article. For comparative figures regarding formal law in
China, see WANG, supra note 130, at 51, 59.
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legislative laws in this area include: Law on Social Security (2014),
Housing Law (2014), Law on Residence (2013), Law on
Environmental Protection (2014), Law on Anti-Corruption (2012),
Ordinance on Population (2008), and Ordinance on Anti-Prostitution
(2003). In the areas of laws dealing with offences, important documents
are Law on Administrative Offences (2012) and Criminal Code (2015).
Mayor procedure laws include: Civil Procedure Code (2015), Criminal
Procedure Code (2015), and Administrative Procedure Law (2015).
Legislative laws are just small number of legal documents in the
Vietnamese legal system. Figure 4 indicates that to implement 366
documents of legislative laws, legal institutions in different levels from
the central Government to communal governors have enacted a
mountain of by-law documents. Vietnamese law is therefore popularly
described as a “jungle of law.”134 Particularly, the number of decisions
is highest, including 99.823 documents. This is due to the fact that this
type of document is the most popular form of regulation which can be
issued by many authorities, namely President of State, Prime Minister,
heads of ministerial bodies, and hundreds of local governors from the
provincial to communal levels.
A huge amount of regulation is enacted my ministry-level bodies.
Figure 5 demonstrates that ministry-level institutions have
promulgated a gigantic amount of by-law documents to exercise their
administrative power and to implement legislative laws. Most notable
are the institutions concerning state finance, such as the Ministry of
Finance and the State Bank. Given that Vietnam is an agricultural
country, a number of regulations are issued from the Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Development.
The context of formal law in Vietnam has been significantly
complicated by thousands of regulations issued by local governments
to implement central laws and to govern local affairs. Figure 6 in the
Appendix indicates that big and prosperous provinces, such as Hanoi
and Hồ Chí Minh City, have considerably higher number of
regulations.
The party-state’s concern is not only rule-making but also
ensuring that the rules meet with normative requirements of formal law.
The foremost aim of the 2005 Legal Reform Strategy is “to construct
134. Đan Thanh, Lạc giữa... “rừng luật” [“Missing the Way in … “The Jungle of Law”],
BÁO AN NINH THỦ ĐÔ (May 27, 2008), http://anninhthudo.vn/chinh-tri-xa-hoi/lac-giua-rungluat/325550.antd [https://perma.cc/RSU6-EETD] (archived Oct. 29, 2017).
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and perfect a legal system that is synthetic, consistent, enforceable,
public, and transparent.”135
The party-state has achieved these goals to some extent. The
formal legal rules are publicly promulgated. After enactment, legal
instruments are published in national gazette. The party-state has had
efforts to make formal law accessible. Several state institutions, like
the National assembly, the Government, and the Ministry of Justice,
also create various online databases of Vietnamese law, which makes
law accessible to the people. The Law on Legal Propaganda and
Education (2012) is enacted to ensure citizens’ right to access to the
law and their duty to study the law (Article 1). Governmental programs
of legal aids are implemented to help law accessible to vulnerable
groups, whose legal framework is the Law on Legal Aid (2006). In
reality, the 2015 Justice Index report demonstrates that: “Overall, more
citizens are accessing legal information from a more diverse range of
information sources compared to previously. This explains the positive
change in access to legal information and the improved legal
knowledge of citizens.”136
On the other hand, there is a significant gap between Vietnamese
formal law and the anticipated goals. To illustrate, an empirical survey
of the Central Institute for Economic Management in 2012 identified
“Nine Nos” in the Vietnamese legal system: no sufficiency; no clarity;
no certainty; no consistency; no transparency; no predictability; no
reasonableness; no effectiveness; and no validity.137 In the review of
ten years of implementation of the 2005 Legal Reform Strategy, the
Party also explicitly acknowledges weakness in the nation’s legal
system as follows:
The legal system has not yet really perfect and synthetic; the
effectiveness and the enforceability have not met with the actual

135. [Politburo], supra note 131.
136. VLA & UN DEV. PROGRAM, JUSTICE INDEX REPORT (2015)
http://www.vn.undp.org/content/vietnam/vi/home/library/democratic_governance/2015justice-index/ [https://perma.cc/7KS9-7B2M] (last visited Oct. 29, 2017). This report is the
result of the collaboration since 2010 between the Viet Nam Lawyers Association, the Centre
for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES) under the Viet Nam Union of
Science and Technology Associations and the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP). The report is based on based on interviews with the 13,841 participants across Viet
Nam.
137. Nam Nguyễn, Tiêu chí xác định chất lượng của hệ thống pháp luật [Criteria of the
Quality of the Legal System], MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, http://moj.gov.vn/qt/tintuc/Pages/nghiencuu-trao-doi.aspx?ItemID=1538 [https://perma.cc/AAG2-8N5M] (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
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demands. In some areas, laws have lacked the stability; the
predictability has not been high; the quality has not been
guaranteed; the amendments and supplementations have been too
frequent. The procedure of making the law has included too many
stages, which made the process of enactment and enforcement
slow. Legal enforcement is the weakest point in implementing the
Resolution 48-NQ/TW. The delay to enact regulations to detail
and instruct [legal implementation] has been relatively popular.
The review, systematization, and codification of law have not yet
forcefully practiced; legal popularization, propaganda and
education has lacked critical solutions and have not yet been
highly effective; staffs in charge with law-making have not yet
been consolidated to meet with the demands of the duties; the
supervision and checking of legal documents have not been often;
the dealing with errors and violations has not yet been thorough;
and legal enforcement in some places and sometimes has been
undisciplined and lacked the high effectiveness of deterrence and
education.138

This problematic context is determined by, among other things,
the authoritarian arrangement. To begin with, Vietnamese formal law
is more instrumental than limiting. The nature of the Vietnamese
authoritarianism characterized by the single leadership of the
Communist Party is one of important factors determining the
instrumentalist nature of Vietnamese formal law. When ruling by fiats
and personal commands has been proven as damaging to political
legitimacy, the party needs to turn to formal law in exercising its power.
Through controlling the state from the capital to remote villages, the
party is able make sure that party’s policies are formalized and
institutionalized by formal law enacted by the different state agencies.
Consequently, law is instrumental to the party-state. The fact that the
majority of formal rules focus the state machinery, as described above,
indicates that law is an instrument for the party-state to formalize and
consolidate its power. Formal law regarding the state machinery is less
concerned with limiting the officials. Formal constitutional rules
containing in the Constitution and organic laws are mainly designed to
structure and enhance the political power. Most important is the
constitutional rule regarding the leadership of the Communist Party
over the state and the society.139 To be sure, there are a few rules for

138. [Politburo], supra note 130.
139. HIẾN PHÁP [CONSTITUTION], art. 4 (2013) (Viet.).
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constitutional constraints, such as the rules on vote of confidence.
Moreover, the huge regulations regarding the administrative system are
primarily concerned with enhancing, using, rather than restraining the
administrative power. Administrative law is basically the instrument
for the state to control people. To be sure, some rules regarding
administrative litigations allow the citizens to constrain administrative
power in concrete cases.
Another problem in Vietnamese formal law concerns the
administrative regulations. As mentioned above, a fewer number of
statutory laws can only be implemented through the huge amount of
administrative regulations. Yet, legislations include very general rules
which allow a wide space for administrative regulations. And, the
administrative regulations do not simply interpret legislations.
Administrative agents seize the space of legislations to extend their
discretionary power. Although the legislative institutions have the
constitutional power to supervise the consistence between
administrative regulations and legislations, it is difficult for them to do
so, given the mountain of administrative regulations and the part-time
nature of the majority of the legislature’s members. Consequently, they
have never practiced this power. Within the administrative system, the
Ministry of Justice is in charge with checking the consistency of
administrative regulations. This body is rather active in this work, but
its work is only advisory. Instead, the issuing institutions retain the
power to revise the challenged laws. In practice, the challenges by the
Ministry of Justice have resulted in the issuing institutions’ revising or
withdrawing the regulations in question.140
The consequence of the extending of administrative discretions
through administrative regulations is significant. Legislative laws may
grant more freedom to citizens, but administrative regulations narrow
it down. For example, the Enterprise Law 2005 guaranteed the freedom
of business, but administrative regulations restricted this freedom by
numerous rules regarding requirements, conditions, and licenses of
conducting business, which gave more discretion to administrative
agencies.141 As a matter of authoritarian arrangement, judicial review

140. For more details, see Bui Ngoc Son, Constitutional Developments in Vietnam in the
First Decade of the Twenty First Century, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA IN THE TWENTY
FIRST CENTURY 207 (Albert Chen ed., 2014).
141. Nguyên Tấn, Tinh thần Luật Doanh nghiệp còn không? [The Spirit of the Enterprise
Law Disappears], THỜI BÁO KINH TẾ SÀI GÒN ONLINE (Aug. 25, 2011),

166

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:135

is absent, and citizens are not allowed to challenge an administrative
regulation with general effect in the courts for the reason that it violates
their rights protected in the Constitution or/and legislations. The
administrative courts are only allowed to hear appeals to administrative
decisions affecting individual cases.
But, as admitted by the party itself, the weakest point in the
Vietnamese formal legal system concerns legal enforcement. VicePresident and then President of the National Assembly Nguyễn Thị
Kim Ngân lamented that: “In Vietnam, there is a very fine and strange
law that the world does have, namely the Law on Legal Propaganda
and Education. That means when there are laws, people do not follow.
Therefore, the Law on Legal Propaganda and Education must be
enacted, but the people still do not follow.”142 This situation is
significantly divorced from the formalist rule of law ideal’s
requirement that law must be obeyed. Empirical survey by the authors
of the 2015 Justice Index confirms the popular culture of turning
against legal institutions because of the problems associated with these
institutions:
Local authorities play an important role in receiving and dealing
with citizens’ legal matters. Unclear procedures for dispute
settlement, lengthy processing time and inefficiency in dispute
resolution are the main reasons why disputants choose to solve
problems by themselves or opt to use informal measures, instead
of turning to local judicial institutions.
The assistance offered by local state agencies in settling disputes
and complaints has not been as effective as the assistance of
lawyers and legal aid providers.
Access to the court is still limited due to disputants’ concerns
about costs, procedures and confidence in the integrity of judges
and court staff.143

So, one of the reasons for the people’s turn against formal law
concerns the poor quality of the authoritarian legal institutions in
delivering justice. Yet, this is not the whole of the story. Another reason
concerns legal history and legal culture, which may need more
http://www.thesaigontimes.vn/59939/Tinh-than-Luat-Doanh-nghiep-con-khong.html
[https://perma.cc/94LV-PV52] (archived Oct. 29, 2017).
142. Việt Nam Có Một Luật Rất Lạ Mà Thế Giới Chưa Có[Vietnam Has A Strange Law
That The World Does Have], BÁO LAO ĐỘNG (Sept. 21, 2013), https://news.zing.vn/viet-namco-mot-luat-rat-la-ma-the-gioi-chua-co-post354226.html.
143. VLA & UN DEV. PROGRAM, supra note 136, at 12-13.
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empirical verification. Formal law has a complex relationship with
legal legacy. Formal law just locates at the top of the Vietnamese legal
pyramid which includes multiple legal layers. Preexisting legal layers
and informal social norms may render formal law ill-enforced.
Vietnamese people are more familiar with living with their traditional
legal culture, customs, and habits than with newly enacted formal legal
rules. Vietnam is an agricultural country, and the majority of the
population (around seventy percent) lives in rural areas. For them,
village law, customary law, and traditional social-moral norms are
more relevant than the Constitution and legislations. Regarding formal
law, they may be concerned with administrative regulations enacted by
communal governments directly relevant to their daily life. The
urbanization has brought thousands of peasants to more modern cities
together with their village mindset, which makes the legal culture of
the emerging middle class in urban areas resonant with their
hometown’s culture. Consequently, even in modern cities, informal
rules prevail over formal rules in many cases. For example, in
economic transactions, personal relationship and social network are in
many cases more relevant than formal legal rules. In the administrative
system, there is a popular saying on the hierarchy of influential factors
in the appointment and promotion: “Nhất hậu duệ, nhì tiền tệ, ba quan
hệ, bốn trí tuệ” [“Descendants first; money second; relationship third;
intelligence fourth”].
E. Global Law.
The final and newest layer of law in China and Vietnam is global
law. Global law is “a multicultural, multinational, and
multidisciplinary legal phenomenon finding its roots in international
and comparative law and emerging through the international legal
practice that was prompted by the globalization of the world
economy.”144 Global law is promoted by “global players”, including
“international organizations, international law practitioners, and
universities.”145 The legal system in China and Vietnam is now added
with global legal rules, norms, and doctrines, which has their roots in
the law of western countries (not necessarily the countries dominated
by the civil legal system) and international law.
144. Pierrick Le Goff, Global Law: A Legal Phenomenon Emerging from the Process of
Globalization, 14 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 119, 128 (2007).
145. Id. at 130.
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Jianfu Chen points out the movement towards “assimilation”,
“harmonization with international practice”, and “internationalization”
of Chinese law, which began in 1992 when the Communist Party
decided to establish a “socialist market economy.”146 He documents
that:
The leaders of the law-making authorities also explicitly endorsed
bold adoption and the direct transplant of foreign laws. With such
a legislative policy in place, the Maritime Code which had been in
the making for over ten years and was primarily composed of
borrowings from international conventions and practice, was not
only adopted in 1992, but its adoption was heralded as an excellent
example for harmonising Chinese law with international practice.
Many long awaited codes, e.g. the Company Law (1993), the
Foreign Trade Law (1994), the Arbitration Law (1994), the Audit
Law (1994), the Securities Law (1995), the People’s Bank Law
(1995), the Law on Commercial Banks (1995), the Law on
Accounting (1995), and the Insurance Law (1995) were all
adopted. Speedy revisions or additions were made to existing laws
which were deemed inconsistent with international practice.
Taxation laws, joint venture laws, intellectual property protection
laws, the Criminal Procedure Law and the Criminal Law, and most
recently, the Company Law, the Securities Law, all underwent
major revisions. Further, China has now ratified a large number of
international conventions dealing with international economic
relations, especially intellectual property protection.147

Another example is the case of the 1999 Contract Law, in which
“the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(1994) and the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (1980) were the actual models, and in some places were
copied article by article.148 Global law affects not only private law but
also public law. As Chen illustrates, “the 1996–1997 (and again, the
2011-12) revisions to the Criminal Procedural Law and Criminal Law
were aimed at absorbing commonly accepted international standards
on justice and the rule of law, rather than following any particularly
legal tradition.”149 Chen finally concludes that: “With these

146.
147.
148.
149.

JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 81 (2016).
Id. at 82-83 (citations omitted).
Id. at 85.
Id. at 86.
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developments, the process is thus better described as the
internationalisation, rather than the westernisation, of Chinese law.”150
Like China, borrowing from global law is an important
mechanism of legal development in Vietnam after the Renovation
program was introduced in 1986. Private law (especially, the civil law
and corporate law) have been developed in this line.151 For example,
“the Enterprise Law (EL) enacted on 12 June, 1999 introduced
comprehensive Western corporate governance rules. Principally
borrowing Anglo-American company law principles, in one hundred
and thirty-four articles the EL regulates directors’ duties, disclosure,
members’ rights (especial those of minority shareholders), boards of
management and inspection board rights and duties, dividend
payments, conversion among corporate entities, dissolution,
dissolution merger and liquidation.”152 Another example: “the key
provisions of the Vietnamese Competition Law [2004], which prohibit
anti-competitive behaviour, abuse of market dominance and other
monopolistic activities, were loosely modelled on the European Union
Competition Law.”153 Public law, like constitutional law, is also
reformed with new global ideas. For example, the 1992 Constitution
adopted the concept of “human rights”. The new Constitution in 2013
further incorporated more human rights familiar in international human
rights treaties, including: the right to life, right not to be expelled from
home territory, right to private family life, presumption of innocence,
right to appeal to higher court, right to favorable working conditions,
prohibition of child labor, and the right to healthy environment.154
The diffusion of global law in China and Vietnam has been driven
by internal and external factors. Internally, domestic economic reform
leads to the need of legal framework for the market, and the global law
can offer solutions for this legal reform; the adoption of global law is
150. Id.
151. Phạm Duy Nghĩa, Tiếp Nhận Pháp Luật Nước Ngoài - Thời Cơ Và Thách Thức Mới
Cho Nghiên Cứu Lập Pháp [Transplants of Foreign Law: Chances and Challenges for
Legislative Legal Studies], 5 NGHIÊN CỨU LẬP PHÁP 50 (2002): 50; Bùi Xuân Hải, Tiếp Nhận
Pháp Luật Nước Ngoài: Lý Thuyết Và Thực Tiễn Trong Pháp Luật Công Ty Việt Nam
[Transplants of Foreign Law: Theory and Practice of Vietnamese Corporate Law] 7 NGHIÊN
CỨU LẬP PHÁP 23 (2006).
152. John Gillespie, Transplanted Company Law: An Ideological and Cultural Analysis
of Market-Entry in Vietnam, 51 INT’L AND COMP. L. Q. 641, 649 (2002).
153. John Gillespie, Localizing Global Competition Law In Vietnam: A Bottom-Up
Perspective, 64 INT’L AND COMP. L. Q. 935, 938 (2015).
154. Bui Ngoc Son, The Global Origins of Vietnam’s Constitutions: Text in Context 2017
U. ILL. L. REV. 525, 542-543 (2017).
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the mechanism to attract foreign investment; socialist leaders adopt
global legal norms to integrate the countries into the global economic
and political order; they also adopt global law to gain more
international legitimacy, by which to enhance domestic legitimacy.
Externally, international agencies (such as World Trade Organization,
World Bank, and United Nations of Development Programme), foreign
governments have sought to diffuse global law into China and Vietnam
through different mechanisms, such as treaty negotiation and
agreements, legal aid programs, and academic exchange programs.155
One feature of the diffusion of global law in China and Vietnam
is that this process is more prominent in private law (especially
business law) than in public law. One of the most important reasons is
that the adoption of global private law does not challenge the socialist
regime while facilitate economic reform, which confer more legitimacy
to the existing regimes. Global norms of public law can be adopted only
to the extent that they can confer more legitimacy to the existing
socialist regime rather than challenge it. This explains why Vietnam
adopts more social, economic, and cultural human rights, but does not
adopt institutions to implement constitutional rights, such as a
constitutional review system or a human right committee.156 Similarly,
Chinese government may adopt global private law but would regard
institutions associated with liberal constitutionalism (such as judicial
review, judicial independence, and the separation of powers) as
dangerous for Chinese socialist regime.157 While global harmonization
of business law is useful for economic development and global
integration, constitutional law is the area for the Chinese government
to maintain the “Chinese characteristics” because constitutional law is
more expressive of national identity than business law. Unlike China,
Vietnam does not have the exceptionalist thinking in developing public
law, but also would not adopt the global public legal norms and
institutions that are potentially destructive to the socialist regime.
Finally, it should be underlined that there is less interaction
between China and Vietnam during their process of adopting global
155. See CHEN, supra note 146, at 85; Gillespie, supra note 152, at 937; Carol V. Rose,
The “New” Law and Development Movement in the Post-Cold War Era: A Vietnam Case Study,
32 L. & SOC’Y REV. 93 (1998).
156. Bui, supra note 151, at 559.
157. See Thomas E. Kellogg, Arguing Chinese Constitutionalism: The 2013
Constitutional Debate and the “Urgency” of Political Reform, 11 E. ASIA L. REV. 337, 389
(2017).
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law. John Gillespie notes that during the early time of Renovation,
“Vietnamese law-makers turned initially to China for legal
inspiration”.158 For example, the provisions on special economic zones
in the Foreign Investment Law of 1987 “drew heavily from the Sinic
templates.” 159 However, Gillespie provides three reasons explaining
the limits of Chinese influence on Vietnamese legal development: the
border war between China and Vietnam in 1979; Vietnamese lawmakers knew more about Soviet and East German law than Chinese
legal and economic development and Chinese language; and in the late
1980s, “the Chinese legal model had not yet proved its capacity to
generate sustained economic growth.”160 Now, the last reason may not
be relevant, but the first two are enhanced by more developments,
which explain the less legal exchange between China and Vietnam: the
conflict between China and Vietnam over the Amphitrite and Spratly
Islands, and increasing number of Vietnamese people studying law in
the western countries and democratic East Asian countries, such as
Japan.
F. Conclusion
It has been seen that Chinese and Vietnamese societies are not
lawless, as there are many laws existing throughout their history.
Different legal systems existed and played different role during
different periods. During pre-modern time, for example, Confucian law
played the dominant role, while indigenous law co-existed. Currently,
socialist law has been the hegemonic layer of law in China and
Vietnam, while elements of other legal layers have co-existed. The coexistence of non-socialist legal layers means not only the concurrent
application of other legal rules, processes and institutions but also the
continuing influences of other legal ideas and legal cultures on the legal
practices.
II. INSTRUMENTALISM? STRATEGIC ACCOMMODATION OF
THE RULE OF LAW
Having documented the existence of law in China and Vietnam,
the next question is whether their law has certain qualities of the rule
158. John Gillespie, The Juridification of State Regulation in Vietnam, in LEGAL
REFORMS IN CHINA AND VIETNAM, supra note 1, at 92.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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of law. Within this single article, I will focus on the current situation of
law in the two countries.161 The rule of law is normally conceived as an
antithesis to communism. For example, Martin Krygier argues that
Marxism did not support legal restraints on power but offered
“considerable support to the repressive, ideological and purely
instrumental uses of law and the rejection and destruction of the rule
of law, which were characteristic of communism.”162 However, there
is a vast literature on the rule of law in China.163 Like China, during the
post-soviet era, Vietnam has been committed to a certain degree of the
rule of law, and this has also been examined by some scholars.164 To
understand the rule of law in China and Vietnam, I propose a
conceptual model of “strategic accommodation” of the rule of law. On
that base, while the instrumental nature of the law has remained
dominant in China and Vietnam, the socialist states have
accommodated some forms of the rule of law as a strategic response to
the need to consolidate the legitimacy of the socialist regimes. The
conceptual model of “strategic accommodation” includes two
components: accommodation and strategy. The idea of accommodation
explains how the rule of law exists under socialism, while the idea of
“strategy” explains why it is so.

161. For the account of the possible existence of the rule of law in pre-modern China and
Vietnam, see TẠ VĂN TÀI, THE VIETNAMESE TRADITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 233 (1988); Qiang
Fang & Roger Des Forges, Were Chinese Rulers Above the Law? Toward a Theory of the Rule
of Law in China from Early Times to 1949 CE, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 101 (2008); Tạ Văn Tài,
Confucian Influences in the Traditional Legal System of Vietnam, with Some Comparisons with
China: Rule by Law and Rule of Law, 1 VIETNAMESE SOC. SCIENCE REV. 11 (2009).
162. See e.g. Martin Krygier, Marxism and the Rule of Law: Reflections after the Collapse
of Communism 15 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 633, 633 (1990).
163. For some recent publications, see KATRIN BLASEK, RULE OF LAW IN CHINA: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH (2016); QUANXI GAO, WEI ZHANG & FEILONG TIAN, THE ROAD TO
THE RULE OF LAW IN MODERN CHINA (2016); CHINA’S SOCIALIST RULE OF LAW REFORMS
UNDER XI JINPING (John Garrick & Yan Chang Bennett eds., 2016); LIN LI, BUILDING THE
RULE OF LAW IN CHINA (2017); SAMLUI SEPPÄNEN, THE IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT AND THE
RULE OF LAW IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2016).
164. John Gillespie, Concept of Law in Vietnam: Transforming Statist Socialism, in ASIAN
DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE
ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. 146 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004); Pip Nicholson,
Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law: The Vietnam Court Experience, 3 AUSTL. J. OF
ASIAN L. 37 (2001); MARK SIDEL, LAW AND SOCIETY IN VIETNAM (2008); VIETNAM AND THE
RULE OF LAW (Carlyle A. Thayer & David G. Marr eds., 1993).
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A. Accommodation: How Is The Rule of Law Possible Under
Socialism?
Law under socialist regimes cannot be evaluated from the
perspective of liberal legalism. If law under socialist regimes is
assessed against substantive requirements of the rule of law specifically
associated with civil liberty, it is hard to find the rule of law here. But,
an exclusive employment of legal formalism is another misleading.
While some scholars have correctly identified the practice of formal
rule of law in socialist regimes like China,165 they tend to ignore or
underestimate other non-formalist dimensions of the rule of law. In
addition, existing formalist accounts of the rule of law fail to appreciate
the complex interwoven and competition of different strands of the rule
of law. Formal legal rules cannot operate neutrally. Rather, they
complexly interact with other aspects of the rule of law. For example,
the legal tradition of non-litigation in part explains why in resolving
civil disputes the Chinese people tend to prefer mediation and informal
institutions than formal legal institutions like courts.166 The substantive
concepts of law also determine positively and negatively the context of
formal law. Positively, the promotion of formal rule of law is
underpinned by the consequentialist conceptualization that the rule of
law can promote economic development. This legal consequentialism
leads to the concerns of not only formal rules but also their substantive
contents: property rights, contract rights, and freedom of conducting
business. Negatively, the statist concept of law reduces formal law to
an instrument to control civil liberty.
To understand how the rule of law is possible under socialist
regime, an accommodationist conceptualization of the rule of law is
necessary. The idea of “accommodation” is useful to capture the
practice of the rule of law under socialism. It refers to a special
arrangement in which a certain mode is dominant while other modes
are tolerated. In this regard, the socialist regime will retain the
hegemony of socialist legality while tolerate some forms of the rule of
law that may conflict with but would not substantively damage the
socialist legality and the socialist regime in general.
165. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 6
(2002) (“both the Party constitution and the 1982 constitution confirm the basic principles of a
government of laws, the supremacy of the law, and equality of all before the law.”)
166. See generally Albert H. Y. Chen, Mediation, Litigation, and Justice: Confucian
Reflections in a Modern Liberal Society, in CONFUCIANISM FOR THE MODERN WORLD 257
(Daniel A. Bell & Hahm Chaibong eds., 2003).
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Accommodationism would reject a clear dichotomy between the
rule of law and authoritarianism. The rule of law is normally conceived
a component of the transition from authoritarian regime to
democracy.167 The implication is that the rule of law and
authoritarianism are something that cannot co-exist in a single polity.
This is a misleading. Even under well-established rule of law systems,
legal authoritarianism can also be partially executed. In this case, the
rule of law is still the hegemonic spirit of the polity, but authoritarian
laws can be implemented in some aspects of the society under certain
circumstances.168 To illustrate, Robert Diab investigates in the United
States “law and policy defining four basic features of authoritarian
legality, including the repudiation of absolute or “non-derogable”
human rights in torture, indefinite detention, and targeted killing; the
expansion of state secrecy and surveillance; judicial deference to
executive discretion; and a reluctance to remedy serious rights
violations, or be held accountable for them.”169 Conversely, even under
well-established authoritarian systems like socialist regimes, the rule
of law can also be partially accommodated. In this case,
authoritarianism remains the hegemonic spirit of the polity, but the rule
of law can also be implemented in some aspects of the society under
certain circumstances.
Accommodationism would adopt an idealist approach to the rule
of law. As Richard H. Fallon argues, “The Rule of Law is an ideal that
can be used to evaluate laws, judicial decisions, or legal systems.”170
The rule of law is an ideal that humankind has tried to achieve in its
broader course of pursuing just, decent, and organized society. The
realization of the rule of law is “a matter of degree.”171 No legal system
can realize the ideal of rule of law perfectly. “A legal system that on
the whole comports with the Rule of Law may nevertheless include

167. Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political
Transformation, 106 YALE L. J. 2009, 2016 (1997).
168. Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, 66 INDIANA LAW
JOURNAL 379, 382 (1991) (Discussing the extreme level of authoritarianism “during the
McCarthy era in the United States, when, as a result of fear, hatred and extreme nationalism, the
government, with private and judicial support, used law to persecute and punish citizens for
being ‘un-Ameri-can’”).
169. ROBERT DIAB, THE HARBINGER THEORY: HOW THE POST-9/11 EMERGENCY
BECAME PERMANENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM 23 (2015).
170. Richard H. Fallon, ‘The Rule of Law’ as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 9 (1997).
171. Id.
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regulations or decisions that do not.”172 In another extreme, a legal
system that on the whole departs from the rule of law may nevertheless
accommodate regulations or decisions that partially meet with the rule
of law desiderata. That means the legal system of authoritarian regimes
can achieve the rule of law ideal to a certain degree. With this
conceptual ground, it can be expected that some expects of the socialist
legal system may substantively depart from the rule of law ideals, while
accommodate them in the other expects. Albert Chen recently discusses
“differential degrees of compliance with the rule of law in different
domains and contexts of the Chinese state and society.”173 To illustrate,
he points out that: “There are certain types of court cases in which
judicial professionalism, autonomy, and independence has developed
considerably, while there are also ‘political sensitive’ cases in which
the courts would defer to relevant party authorities.174 Drawing from
empirical survey, Wang Yuhua also argues about “a partial form of the
rule of law”175 in China.
Accommodationism would also adopt the rule of law as a multidimensional concept. Fallon’s typology of the rule of law ideal is useful
in this regard. Accordingly, although the rule of law is a contested ideal,
virtually all contested arguments about the rule of law ideal can be
modelled by a historic, formalist, legal process, or substantive ideal
type.176 Firstly, “A historicist ideal type of the Rule of Law, in order to
be coherent, must be conceived as internal to a legal culture, form of
life, hermeneutic circle, or interpretive community; meaning cannot be
conceived as independent of culture, context, or shared
understandings.”177 So, in historic rule of law ideal, legal actors are
bound by pre-established legal legacy, legal culture, and shared
underlining principles of an interpretive community. Secondly, under
the formalist ideal type, to borrow Justice Antonin Scalia’s utterance,
the rule of law means a law of rules.178 Rules are conceived as “a clear
prescription that exist prior to its application and that determine
appropriate conduct or legal outcomes.”179 The formalist rule of law is
172. Id.
173. Albert Chen, China’s Long March toward Rule of Law’ or ‘China’s Turn Against
Law? 4 CHINESE J. OF COMP. L. 30 (2016).
174. Id.
175. WANG, supra note 130, at 18 (emphasis in original).
176. Fallon, supra note 170, at 10.
177. Id. at 14.
178. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
179. Fallon, supra note 170, at 14.
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underpinned by the assumption on “human being as rational planners
and maximizers, who reasonably demand to know in advance the legal
consequences of alternative courses of action.”180 Proponents of legal
formalism include A.V. Dicey, Friedrich Hayek, John Rawls, Joseph
Raz, and Lon L. Fuller.181 In particular, Fuller identifies eight
requirements of formal rule of law or “legality”, including: generality,
clarity, public promulgation, stability, prospective, free of
contradiction, possible to obey, and the consistence between
promulgated laws and their actual administration.182 Thirdly, the legal
process type focuses procedural requirements in the development and
application of legal norms.183 These include, for example, fairness, due
process, and judicial review of legislative, executive, and
administrative actions.184 Finally, the substantive ideal type of rule of
law insists that “the forms of law- which may encompass rules,
conventions of legal reasoning, and process of legal deliberation- are
unintelligible as legal norms in the absence of rationally cognizable
purposes that possess reasonable claims to moral allegiances.”185
Ronald Dworkin, for example, insists on the individual rights as the
substantive requirement of the rule of law.186 Frank Michelman’s
“Law’s Republic” treats freedom under law as the substance of the rule
of law.187
The rule of law strands do not exist independently in a legal
system. Rather, they are complexly interwoven and compete with each
other.188 There may be relative priority of different rule of law strands
in different legal systems. And within a legal system, there may be
relative priority of a certain strand of the rule of law in different
periods. Therefore, an account of the rule of law in different contexts
must take into account the complex manifestation, interaction, and
competition of different rule of law ideal types. Fallon suggests that:
“To the extent that the ideal types reflecting conflicting values or
approaches, a sound theory needs assign relative priorities, assess the

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, REVISED EDITION 33-94 (1964).
Fallon, supra note 170, at 18.
Id.
Id. at 21.
See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
Fallon, supra note 170, at 42.
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significance of greater or lesser departures from relevant desiderata,
and identity the pertinence of various contextual factors.”189
The socialist regimes in China and Vietnam have partially
accommodated different strands of the rule of law. Consider first the
partial existence of the historic type the rule of law. This is evidenced
by the recent practice of “guiding cases,” a kind of case-law, in China
and Vietnam. Recently, the supreme courts in both countries have
drawn on their decisions to issue de facto biding decisions guiding the
adjudication of the lower courts in similar cases.190 In this context,
lower courts are constrained by the pre-established legal rules. But, the
account of historic strand of the rule of law should go beyond the mere
consideration of the binding of precedents or particular historic legal
rules. The historic strand of the rule of law is also achieved when the
arbitrariness of legal actors (e.g., politicians, law-makers, and judges)
are constrained by the historic legal legacy, legal culture, and legal
principles. The communist authorities in China and Vietnam cannot
completely ignore other layers of law that have existed throughout their
legal history. The communists’ development and application of law is
also constrained by historicist legal norms, institutions, and shared
principles of the respective interpretive communities. To illustrate,
communist legal actors have to respect the rights of the indigenous
peoples to live according to their own chthonic law. To some extent,
they are also constrained by Confucian legal culture, as evidenced by
its continued influence in different aspects of the legal system as
documented above.
That said, the historicist rule of law is partially practiced. In other
words, communist legal actors are only partially constrained by
historicist legal sources. Historicist legal sources can constrain but at
the same time are manipulated by communist legal actors. Most
importantly, without judicial review system, the communist authorities
have the monopolist power to apply and interpret the historicist legal
sources in the line with their interests. The revival of hương ước in
Vietnam is an example. Hương ước is both expressive of the
189. Id. at 43-4.
190. See Mo Zhang, Pushing the Envelope: Application of Guiding Cases in Chinese
Courts and Development of Case Law in China 26. WASH. INT’L. L. J. 269 (2017); Mark Jia,
China Common Law? Guiding Cases and Judicial Reform, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2213 (2016).
For the case of Vietnam, see Tòa án Nhân dân Tối cao [The People’s Supreme Court], Đề án
Phát triển triển án lệ ban hành theo Quyết định 74/QĐ-TANDTC ngày 31/10/2012 [The Proposal
to Develop Precedents Issued together With Decision 74/QĐ-TANDTC, dated Oct, 31 2012].
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indigenous identity of the communal community and instrumental to
the implementation of the state’s policies at the village level.
The second, formalist type of the rule of law is more remarkable
in China and Vietnam, evidenced by the enactment of numerous formal
laws. The promulgation of numerous formal legal rules indicates the
regime’s commitment to formal legality in exercising the public power.
Governing through formal law is at least better than lawless or ruling
by personal fiats. Moreover, the socialist legal system meets with the
some requirements of formalist rule of law ideal to some extent, such
as publicity and enforceability. Without judicial review, the two
countries have developed specific mechanism called “filing and
review” to make sure that formal laws are free of contradiction.191
The focus on formal law is due to epistemological and practical
reasons. First, the promotion of formal law is consistent with the
positivist view of the law endorsed by the socialist states as the
consequence of the influence of Marxist legal philosophy. From this
positivist perspective, law must come from the state rather than from
the interpretative community, although the guiding cases can be
tolerated to some extent when formal law is not available. Second,
formal law meets with the socialist states’ imperative of regulating new
areas emerged from the development of the market, the increasing
complex society, and the need of more effective state institutions,
which are the consequence of the implementation of the economic
reform initiatives. Finally, formal law has empty contents192 and hence
is not detrimental to the existing socialist regime.
Third, legal process in China and Vietnam is basically
authoritarian but also includes some rule of law elements. The judicial
process is politically controlled but also has some elements of legal
process rule of law ideal. Wang Yuhua argues that courts in China are
independent and enforce the law equally in commercial realm but not

191. See Keith Hand, Understanding China’s System for Addressing Legislative Conflicts:
Capacity Challenges and the Search for Legislative Harmony, 26 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 139
(2013) (discussing the way China addressed legislative conflict through the system of filing and
review of legislation at different levels of government); LÊ HỒNG SƠN, ED., MỘT SỐ NỘI DUNG
QUY ĐỊNH VỀ RÀ SOÁT, HỆ THỐNG HÓA VĂN BẢN QUY PHẠM PHÁP LUẬT [SOME ISSUES ON
THE REGULATIONS ON REVIEW AND STANDARDIZATION OF LEGAL NORMATIVE DOCUMENTS]
(2013) (a collection of legal rules defining the system of filing and review of legislation at
different levels of government in Vietnam).
192. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 93
(2004).
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in political realm.193 The logic is that local governments in the regions
where economic development relies more on foreign investment will
foster the formal rule of law to attract foreign investment, but the rule
of law will not be extended to the realm where the citizens seek to
challenge the government action in courts.194 In the case of Vietnam,
Nicholson argues that: “The contemporary Vietnamese court is
concurrently a legal and political institution. Legal in that ideally it is
bound by law, political in that ultimately it works for the party-state
and must resolve matters in accordance with a complex hierarchy of
influences, only once of which is law.”195 The political side is dominant
and illustrates the authoritarian feature of the judicial process. The
legislative and executive actions are not subjected to judicial review:
conversely, the judicial process is controlled by the political powers.
However, the legal side illustrates some partial achievement of the legal
process rule of law ideal. At least in formal terms, some fair trail rights
are constitutionally guaranteed, including the right to counsel, the right
to public trial, and the prohibition of double jeopardy. Notably, the new
2013 Constitution introduces more rights which aim to ensure the
fairness in judicial process, namely, presumption of innocence, the
right to a timely trial, the right to “fair” trial,196 and right to appeal to
higher court.197 The new Criminal Procedural Code in 2015 introduces
the principle of adversarial trial and extends the types and the rights of
the defenders.198 These procedural developments are meant to limit the
arbitrary powers of the judicial institutions. In practical terms, trials
have been publicly held, which allows the public to supervise the
judicial process. Some important cases have been even live televised.
Professional lawyers are more active in the judicial process. The trials
are predominantly inquisitorial but increasingly adversarial in recent
years.199
193. WANG, supra note 130, at 18.
194. Id. at 18, 22.
195. Pip Nicholson, Renovating Courts: The Role of Courts in Contemporary Vietnam, in
ASIAN COURTS IN CONTEXT 562 (Jiunn-rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang eds., 2015).
196. HIẾN PHÁP [CONSTITUTION], art. 31 (2013) (Viet.).
197. Id. art. 103
197. Hoàng Nhưỡng, Những điểm mới nổi bật của Bộ luật Tố tụng hình sự 2015 [New
Remarkable Points in the Criminal Procedural Code 2015], BÁO ĐIỆN TỬ QUÂN ĐỘI NHÂN
DÂN (June 22, 2016), http://www.qdnd.vn/xa-hoi/nhung-diem-moi-noi-bat-cua-bo-luat-totung-hinh-su-2015-481439 [https://perma.cc/HZ6M-KQHN] (archived Oct. 29, 2017).
199. Trần Duy Bình, Thực trạng và một số kiến nghị nhằm nâng cao chất lượng tranh
tụng tại phiên tòa hành sự theo tinh thần cải cách tư pháp[The Reality and some Suggestions to
Enhance the Quality of Adversarial Process in Trials According to the Spirit of Judicial
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Let’s now turn to consider the substantive type of the rule of law
in China and Vietnam. The so-called “socialist rule of law state”
(Chinese: shuhui zhuyi fazhiguo; Vietnamese: nha nuoc phap quyen xa
hoi chu nghia) was adopted by the communist leaders of the respective
countries in the middle of the 1990s, and was then enshrined in the
national constitutions in China in 1999 and in Vietnam in 2001.200
However, the substantive meanings of the “socialist rule of law state”
are ambiguous.
On 23 October, 2014, in the 4th Plenum of the 18th Congress of
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the party’s Central Committee
passed a decision focusing on promoting the “socialist rule of law
state”, called “Decision on Some Major Issues Concerning
Comprehensively Promoting Governing the Country According to
Law.”201 The Decision “persist[s] in marching the path of Socialist rule
of law with Chinese characteristics, build a Socialist rule of law system
with Chinese characteristics.”202 The Decision persists in these
“principles”: the leadership of the Chinese communist party “within the
scope of the Constitution and the law”; “the dominant position of the
people”, including the protection of people’s basic rights and ensuring
of their duties; equality of all “in the fact of the law”;203 “integrating
ruling the country according to the law and ruling the country according
to virtue”; and “starting from China’s reality.”204 This Decision is
subject to controversial academic debates.205 In the case of Vietnam,
Reform], TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC KIỂM SÁT HÀ NỘI, http://tks.edu.vn/thong-tin-khoa-hoc/chitiet/79/189.
200. For China, see PEERENBOOM, supra note 165, at 6. For Vietnam, see John Gillespie,
Changing Concepts of Socialist Law in Vietnam, in ASIAN SOCIALISM AND LEGAL CHANGE:
THE DYNAMICS OF VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE REFORM 45 (John Gillespie & Pip Nicholson
eds., 2005).
201. CCP Central Committee, Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in
Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the Law, CHINA COPYRIGHT
AND MEDIA [Oct 28, 2014], https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccpcentral-committee-decision-concerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-movinggoverning-the-country-according-to-the-law-forward [https://perma.cc/5SRW-9ZS4] (archived
Oct. 29, 2017).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Randall Peerenboom, Fly High the Banner of Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese
Characteristics! What Does the 4th Plenum Decision Mean for Legal Reforms in China? HAGUE
J. RULE L. (2015) 7: 49, 58 (arguing that the decision “established socialist rule of law with
Chinese characteristics as the foundation for all legal reforms”); Eva Pils, China, the Rule of
Law, and the Question of Obedience: A Comment on Professor Peerenboom, HAGUE J. RULE
L. (2015) 7: 83 (criticizing Peerenboom’s view as “inaccurate account of (positivistic and
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the “socialist rule of law state” is said to have the following distinctive
characters: the leadership of the Vietnamese communist party, the
supremacy of the constitution, all state powers belonging to the people,
the unity of state powers, the promotion of the law together with
enhancing education of social morality, human rights going hands in
hands with the citizens’ duties and obligations to the state and the
nation.206 So, there are several common features in the construction of
the meanings of the “socialist rule of law state” in China and Vietnam.
I contend that among the three western versions of the rule of law,
the Anglo-American “rule of law”, the French État de droit, and the
German Rechtsstaat, the version of “socialist rule of law state” is closer
to the Germen version. The Anglo-American concept of the rule of law
focuses on legal limitations of the state power to protect natural
rights,207 and this is clearly contradictory to the socialist state’s strong
concern on strengthening the control of the state over individuals
through regulations. The French État de droit, characterized by the
concept of constitutional state as legal protector of fundamental rights
from legislative infringements,208 is also unsuitable to the socialist
states which make the national legislatures the supreme body as the
embodiment of unitary power. Instead, the German Rechtsstaat is more
attractive to the socialist states.209 The evolution of this concept has a
long history, associated with Kant’s philosophy and legal positivism.210
Michel Rosenfeld summarizes the features of the German Rechtsstaat
as follows:
Like its Kantian counterpart, today’s Rechtsstaat enshrines
fundamental rights above the realm of ordinary laws, although
these rights are substantive rather than formal and differ
significantly in content from their Kantian predecessors. On the
other hand, like its positivistic predecessor, today’s Rechtsstaat
institutionalizes legality, but it is a legality that is not merely
dependent on consistency and predictability, but also contingent
naturalist) liberal conceptions of law prevents him from understanding the implications of this
decision’s deeply illiberal commitment to power concentration and Party supremacy over law.”).
206. Nguyễn Trọng Phúc, Sáng tỏ Nội dung Xây dựng Nhà nước pháp quyền” [“The
Contents of Building the Rule of Law State are Clear], BÁO ĐIỆN TỬ CHÍNH PHỦ [Dec. 01,
2014], http://baodientu.chinhphu.vn/Tin-noi-bat/Sang-to-noi-dung-xay-dung-Nha-nuoc-phapquyen/190835.vgp [https://perma.cc/ATC2-BZUU] (archived Oct. 29, 2017).
207. Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy,
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1334 (2001).
208. Id. at 1330.
209. See id. at 1318.
210. See id. at 1319.
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on constitutional conformity and on the realization of
constitutionally recognized substantive goals. This, in turn, tends
to constitutionalize all politics and to convert the Rechtsstaat into
a Verfassungsstaat (i.e., a state rule through the constitution) as
some German scholars have argued. Finally, even beyond
constitutionalization as such, today’s Rechtsstaat judicializes
realms, such as the promotion of welfare, which were clearly
relegated to politics by its nineteenth century predecessors.211

Like the German Rechtsstaat, the “socialist rule of law state”
underlines governing through the law, constitutionalization of the state
organization and operation, constitutional supremacy, and the
protection of fundamental rights. The socialist states in China and
Vietnam might have adapted the Rechtsstaat to generate the “socialist
rule of law state”, the mélange of Rechtsstaat, socialist, and local
elements. There are good reasons for this. The Rechtsstaat’s positivist
view that the state is the exclusive channel of law is consistent with the
socialist legality which equally underlines the statist nature of law.
Moreover, the idea of governing through promulgated law is also
attractive to the socialist states because this provides the justification
for governing the transitional society through formal regulations. But,
the German Rechtsstaat has both formal and substantive contents. It
also stresses the constitutionally protected fundamental rights above
ordinary law and politics.212 The socialist states might has adopted and
adapted this idea with a commitment to constitutional supremacy and
protection of constitutional rights, which can be regarded as the rule of
law elements in the “socialist rule of law state.” This rule of law
elements exist in tension with the socialist elements, such as the
leadership of the communist party, the concentration of state power,
and the statist rights of citizens. In addition, “socialist rule of law state”
also includes elements reflecting the local values. This is evident in the
emphasis on the role of moral values, which resonates with the
Confucian tradition of the rule of virtue. In short, the version of
“socialist rule of law state” is an ambiguous and dissonant ideology of
substantive law in which socialist legal statism remains dominant, but
some substantive ideas of the rule of law are partially adopted.

211. Id. at 1328-29.
212. Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, supra
note 207, at 1327.
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B. Strategy: Why Do Socialist Regimes Accommodate The Rule of
Law?
The strategic approach, which has been applied in economics,
political science, and more recently legal studies, focuses on rational
actors’ calculus of costs and benefits of “potential courses of action.”213
As David Collier and Deborah L. Norden write, “a strategy is a calculus
of behavior adopted to enhance the likelihood of achieving some goal,
such as reform or democracy.”214 Applying the “strategic-realist
approach” in comparative constitutional inquiry, Ran Hirschil argues
that “The quest to increase benefits and lower risks and costs - most
notably by enhancing regime legitimacy and stature, promoting
centralization and fostering nation-building or locking in a certain set
of contested worldviews and policy preferences- is a major determinant
of constitutionalization.”215
The strategic accounts are particularly relevant to socialist
regimes in China and Vietnam where law and politics are
indistinguishable. The socialist regimes that survive the fall of the
Berlin Wall are dynamic enough to adjust themselves to the changing
world, which explains their resilience.216 Nowadays, they have been
operating under the domestic and international milieus substantively
different from the Soviet era. Domestically, they have to consolidate
the sociological base of legitimacy by their actual performance, and
economic development is a key concern. The accommodation of some
forms of the rule of law can benefit economic development and hence
socialist elite’s legitimacy. Moreover, the socialist states also need to
build state institutions, which is instrumental to its consolidated power
and its legitimacy, because powers that are institutionalized can
become stronger and more legitimate than personalized powers. Some
forms of the rule of law can also be used for these institutional
purposes. Internationally, the socialist countries like China and
Vietnam have actively integrated politically and economically into to
the global order. To acclimate to the changing world, the communist
nations have been compelled to adapt its ideology, institutions,
213. Ozan O. Varol, Stealth Authoritarianism, 100 IOWA L. REV 1673, 1718 (2015).
214. David Collier and Deborah L. Norden, Strategic Choice Models of Political Change
in Latin America, 24 COMPARATIVE POLITICS, 229, 230 (1992).
215. RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 175 (2014).
216. For ideological, institutional, and economic adaption in communist regimes, see
generally, DIMITROV, supra note 5.
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economy, and law by, among other things, accommodating some forms
of the rule of law familiar with the global community to gain more
international legitimacy, which in turn can also consolidate domestic
legitimacy.
But, the socialist regimes have been confronted with the dilemma.
On the one hand, the rule of law has the potential to ruin the socialist
regimes. On the other hand, these regimes have to be dynamic enough
to be resilient by, among other things, accommodating some forms of
the rule of law. The solution for this is to adopt some realistic strategies
to legal reform. These strategies must guarantee the hegemony of
communist rule and the accommodation of the rule of law at the same
time. The rule of law is accommodated to the extent that it will not
substantively challenge the existing socialist regimes. To achieve this,
the socialist regimes adopt the differential and partial strategies to legal
reform: the rule of law can only be achieved differentially and partially.
By this, legality under socialist regimes is transformative, not
revolutionary. The whole practice of the rule of law (with the
substantive adoption and practice of precedents, judicial review,
judicial independence, the separation of power, multi-party system,
free elections, and civil-political rights) will damage the socialist
regime, for which this is impossible. But, the “partial form of the rule
of law,” as Wang Yuhua argues,217 is a legal reform, not legal
revolution, for which this is possible.
The “differential” strategy means that the socialist regimes have
different approaches to different types of the rule of law and the
application of the rule of law in different areas of the society. This is
resonated with Albert Chen’s argument.218 First, the socialist regimes
practice different types of the rule of law but would have priority to the
types that are more instrumental to their legitimacy and less damaging
to the existence regimes. This explains their prioritization of the
formalist type of the rule of law. Second, within a single type, the rule
of law is applied differently in different realms. As Wang’s study
suggests, the Chinese government can accommodate the (legal process)
rule of law in commercial realm, but not in political realm.219 But, this
differential approach is not limited to the procedural rule of law. On the
substantive rule of law, the socialist governments may have different

217. WANG, supra note 130, at 18.
218. Chen, supra note 173, at 30.
219. WANG, supra note 130, at 3.
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strategy to different substances of law. For example, they can
accommodate more social economic rights than civil-political rights,
as the former can consolidate the sociological foundation of the
political legitimacy, while the latter would open the door for the
citizens to challenge the existing regime. To illustrate, the freedom to
do business is more accommodated than the freedom of speech and
expression.
III. ASSIMILATIONISM? TWO DISTINCTIVE LEGAL SYSTEMS
Having demonstrated that law in China and Vietnam has a rich
history, and that the law embodies some rule of law qualities, the next
question is whether there are distinctive legal systems in these
countries. I argue that there are two legal systems practiced in China
and Vietnam, namely the Confucian legal system and the socialist legal
system, which are separate from other traditional, and modern legal
systems of the world. However, before considering these legal systems,
it is necessary to define what constitutes a legal system.
A. Legal System
For the purpose of this study, I deploy the concept of “legal
system” rather “legal families” or “legal tradition” although the two
later may have virtues in their own ways. Unlike the concept of legal
families, the concept of legal system does not focus on legal methods,
legal sources, and style of trials.220 Unlike the concept of legal tradition,
the concept of legal system is not primarily concerned with the
transmission of legal information across generations.221 To be sure, all
of these elements are reflected in the concept of legal system.
Lawrence M. Friedman defines a legal system as including three
elements, namely: structure, substance, and culture.222 The structure of
the legal system refers to “the skeleton or framework, the durable part,
the part that gives a kind of shape and definition to the whole.”223 This
legal structure is consisted of the organizations, sizes, jurisdictions of
the basic branches of state: the judiciary, the legislature, and the
executive.224 The second element of the legal system is its substance
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

For legal families, see SIEMS, supra note 12, at 75.
GLENN, supra note 10, at 13.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 19-22 (1998).
Id. at 19.
Id. 19-20.
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defined as “the actual rules, norms, and behavior patterns of people
inside the system.”225 The third element is legal culture, or “the
people’s attitude toward law and the legal system- their beliefs, values,
ideas, which concerns the legal system.”226 Friedman underlines that:
“the legal culture, in other words, is the climate of social thought and
social force that determine how law is used, avoided, or abused.”227
Friedman provides a useful framework to conceptualize a legal
system. However, in addition to the three elements, there may be a forth
element namely the jurisprudential foundation of a legal system.
Drawing on the work of post-modern legal comparativists,228 this refers
to the fundamental principles, concepts, ideas, that underline the whole
legal system. The jurisprudential foundation shapes the creation and
operation of legal institutions, the substantive contents of the law, and
the way people use or avoid the law. Jurisprudential element is different
from the cultural element in Friedman’s construction as the latter only
refers to the way of legal practice.
All in all, a legal system can be conceptualized as including four
elements: jurisprudence, structure, substance, and culture. With this in
mind, we will consider the Confucian legal system and the socialist
legal system in the next sections.
B. The Confucian Legal System
The Confucian legal system can be considered a distinctive legal
system as it has distinctive jurisprudence, structure, substance, and
culture. The jurisprudential foundation of the Confucian legal system
is the Confucian philosophy. The Confucian legal system is underlined
by distinctive Confucian concepts, principles, and doctrines, such as,
ren (humaneness), li (rituals), yi (righteousness), zhong (loyalty), xiao
(filial piety), five relationships (ruler - ruled, father-son, husband-wife,
elder brother -younger brother, friend-friend), junzi (gentlemen),
zhengming (rectification of names), and minben (people-as-basis). The
conceptual foundation of the Confucian legal system is drawn on
classical Confucianism, but the evolution of this legal system in
different periods of time in China was accompanied by the evolution
of Confucianism. Consequently, the jurisprudential foundation of
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 21.
SIEMS, supra note 12, at 98-99.
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Confucian legal system evolved over time, with the reconstruction of
the classical Confucian ideas and concepts and the generation of new
ideas and concepts of neo-Confucians. For example, the Confucian
legal system in the Sung dynasty (1127–1279) in China was
underpinned by Sung Neo-Confucians, particularly, Zhu Xi (11301200), who integrates “law closely with both morality and his
metaphysical views on li (principle).229
The second element of the Confucian legal system is structure.
The monarch, as an institution, is the most important element in the
Confucian legal structure. A legitimate monarch is required to work for
the happiness of the people, as stipulated by the concept of minben
(people-as basis.) A physical king must also act in accordance with the
expected virtues and functions of an ideal king, as suggested by the
doctrine of zheng-ming (rectification of names).230 In addition to the
monarchial institution, there are several distinctive institutions
designed to implement the Confucian philosophical concepts and
principles regarding the virtues of the rulers and officers, including: the
royal examination system, the imperial lectures, the censorate, and the
historic offices.231
The third element of the Confucian legal system is its substance.
The substance of the Confucian legal system includes the rules and
norms. The sources of these rules and norms include Confucian
classics, imperial codes, imperial regulations, case-law, and customary
law.232 The contents of the rules and norms cover different aspects, not
merely crimes and punishments, although the Confucian legal rules and
norms are normally backed by criminal sanctions. The substance of the
Confucian legal system extended from criminal law to criminal and
civil procedures, litigation, family law, land law, property law,
administrative law, and even constitutional law (fundamental rules and
norms regulating the imperial power). To be sure, the Confucian legal
system does not have a clear distinction of these areas of law as modern
legal systems.

229. Norman P. Ho, The Legal Philosophy of Zhu Xi (1130-1200) and NeoConfucianism’s Possible Contributions to Modern Chinese Legal Reform, 3 TSINGHUA CHINA
L. REV. 168 (2011) (not be confused between li (理) [“principle”] with li (礼) [‘rituals’], id.,
186).
230. For more details, BUI, supra note 34, at 43-45.
231. Id., at 83.
232. Albert Chen, Confucian Legal Culture and Its Modern Fate, in THE NEW LEGAL
ORDER IN HONG KONG 519-20 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1999).

188

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:135

Finally, the Confucian legal system has distinctive legal culture.
One example is the culture of non-litigation (wusong) stemming from
the related doctrine of social harmony and the disregard of the pursuit
of material interests in the name of moral self-cultivation.233 This
culture is significantly different from the litigious tendency in liberalist
and individualist legal culture.234 Another culture is called “legalization
of morality,”235 or the protection and enforcement of moral values by
law, as opposed to the liberalist trend to separation of law from
morality, underpinned by the concept of neutral government.236 In other
words, in the Confucian legal culture, there is no a clear distinction
between law and morality. Last but not least, the Confucian legal
system has generated what can be called “Confucian constitutional
ethics” which emphasizes the necessity of political leaders’ acquiring
moral virtues and their propriety in practicing political power. This is
different from liberal constitutionalism which focuses mainly on the
political leaders’ observation of constitutional rules.237
Nowadays, in China and Vietnam, Confucianism has been no long
the official ideology, and the Confucian legal system has been no
longer implemented. The jurisprudential, structural, and substantial,
and cultural elements of the current legal systems in the two countries
are significantly informed by socialist and global elements. Yet, as
mentioned above, some Confucian values and ideas, such as filial piety,
are still reflected in the modern law in China and Vietnam. There is
another area of the legal system in which the Confucian influence is
prominent, namely legal culture. The triumph of communism, the
borrowing of socialist law, and the diffusion of global law have
virtually removed the Confucian, structural, and substantial elements
from the legal system. However, the Confucian legal culture ingrains
in the mindset of the people for thousand years and operates at the subconscious level, and therefore, is difficult to be eradicated within a few
233. Chen, supra note 166, at 260-61.
234. FRIEDMAN, supra note 222, at 20.
235. Caleb Wan, Confucianism and Higher Law Thinking in Ancient China, 10 REGENT
J. INT’L L.77, 97 (2013).
236. For a comparison of Chinese and western legal culture, see Zhiping Liang,
Explicating “Law”: A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western Legal Culture, 3 J.
CHINESE L. 50 (1989).
237. For criticism of this liberal tendency and the call for constitutional ethics, see Keith
E. Whittington, On the Need for A Theory of Constitutional Ethics, 9 THE GOOD SOCIETY 60
(2000). See also, JAMES M. BUCHANAN, JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 371 (1999) (proposing the concept of “ethics of constitutional
citizenship”).
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decades. Consequently, the Confucian legal culture remains its
influences. The tendency to avoid going to the court, to legalize moral
values (as the cases of filial piety law), and to aspect political leaders
to have moral values is still evident in China and Vietnam. Even global
legal scripts are also viewed, understood, and re-interpreted by the local
people with the infusion of Confucian meanings.238 The Confucian
influence on legal culture in China and Vietnam may be un-conscious:
the people may not aware of the Confucian roots in their legal behavior
and attitudes. Finally, the contemporary influence of the Confucian
legal culture is fragmentary rather comprehensive as it was during the
imperial time.
C. The Socialist Legal System
During the soviet era, comparative law scholars added the third
legal system, namely socialist law, to the two familiar legal systems
(common law and civil law).239 After the collapse of the Soviet Union,
socialist law has virtually disappeared in comparative law literature.240
John Quigley in his influential article published during the Soviet era
concluded that socialist law “contains features,” but “those points of
difference have not removed socialist law from the civil law tradition,”
because of “the historical connection of socialist law to civil law and
the continuing relevance in socialist law of civil law rules, methods,
institutions, and procedures.”241 Wring after the soviet era, Inga
Markovits argued that socialist law was not dead simply because it did
not exist: the alleged features of socialist law are not confined to the
law of the former socialist countries.242 Recently, William Partlett and
Eric C Ip revitalized the debate, arguing that socialist law has
distinctive features, and that socialist law has not been dead as it has
still influenced the current Chinese public law.243 I argue that socialist
law is a distinctive legal system which is still implemented in China
and Vietnam.
238. Gillespie, supra note 152, at 953 (discussing how several Confucian norms (such as
filial piety, loyalty, and gentlemen) influence the way the Vietnamese people understand
competition law.).
239. RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD
TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW (1968).
240. Partlett & Ip, supra note 102, at 473.
241. Quigley, supra note 19, at 808.
242. Inga Markovits, The Death of Socialist Law? 3 ANNUAL REV. LAW. SOC. SCI. 233
(2007).
243. Partlett & Ip, supra note 102, at 465.
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To begin with, socialist law is underpinned by distinctive
jurisprudential foundation. A legal system is characterized not only by
rules, methods, institutions, and procedures, but more essentially by
jurisprudential foundation or fundamental ideas and principles that
underpin the legal system. In this regard, socialist law is undergirded
by distinctive fundamental legal ideas and principles, which
differentiates it from other legal systems, and hence makes it a
distinctive legal system. The ideational foundation of socialist law is
rooted in Marxism-Leninism, defined by these distinctive legal
concepts: “socialist legality”; “vanguardism”; “democratic
centralism”; “public ownership of means of productions”, and statist
rights. These concepts are hegemonic in the socialist legal system,
dominating the law-making and legal discourse and practices of
politicians, legislators, lawyers, officers, and ordinary citizens. Other
legal systems do not have such concepts or vocabularies. These
concepts are embodied in the socialist legal system and guild the
direction of legal evolution and of the society as a whole towards what
the communists believe as the paradise of socialism and then
communism. Therefore, the Law on Legislation in China requires that:
“Lawmaking shall adhere to the basic principles of the Constitution,
and shall be centered around economic development, and shall adhere
to the socialist road, adhere to the democratic dictatorship by the
people, adhere to the leadership by the Chinese Communist Party, and
adhere to the theory of Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong thoughts
and Dengxiaoping theory, and adhere to the reform and opening to the
outside world.”244
Socialist law may contain some rules and procedures similar to
those of civil law, but they are fundamentally sustained by different
legal principles, which make the operation, manifestation, and nuance
of the similar rules and procedures different. For example, the concept
of public ownership may be adopted in other legal systems, but in the
socialist legal system, this concept dominates the whole economy and
the whole property regime with the regime’s aspiration to achieve the
socialist paradise in which every property belong to the public.
Moreover, the domination of the communist party also means that its
ideology (Marxism-Leninism) dominates the whole intellectual life of

244. LEGISLATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2000), art. 3.
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the society despite the emergence of pluralist ideas due to social
complexity and globalization.
Partlett and Ip correctly point out that socialist law is evident in
Chinese public law. This is evident in Vietnam as well. However, the
influence of socialist law in China and Vietnam is not confined to
public law. Even private law is also influenced by the socialist legal
concepts and principles. Law for the market, such as corporate law,
competition law, investment law, and property law, cannot escape the
“socialist orientation” of the market economy. The so-called
“economic law” in China which has it root in Soviet law is an
instrument for the state to direct the economy towards the state’s
socialist goal. The Chinese government defines the function of
economic law as follow: “Economic laws are a collection of laws and
regulations which adjust social and economic relations arising from the
state’s intervening in, managing and regulating economic activities for
the society’s overall interests. They provide legal devices and an
institutional framework for the state to conduct appropriate
intervention in, and macro control of the market economy, thereby
preventing malpractices resulting from spontaneous and blind
operation of the market economy.”245 Vietnam also has the “economic
law,” which has the same instrumental function, although it has
gradually changed to be more like business law.246 In fact, the whole
legal system in China and Vietnam are underlined by the fundamental
socialist legal concepts and principles. Some aspects of the legal system
in China and Vietnam may contain some non-socialist elements, but
fundamental socialist legal concepts and principles, such as “socialist
legality”, the leadership of the communist party; “democratic
centralism”, remains dominant in the legal system. Finally, socialist
law and socialist legal theory have still provided distinctive legal
vocabularies and concepts for legal discourse in China and Vietnam.247
Let us now turn to consider the second element in the socialist
legal system: the structure. The most important element in the socialist
legal structure is the communist party, which differentiates the socialist
245. STATE COUNCIL WHITE PAPER, supra note 123.
246. See e.g., PHAM, supra note 53, at 50.
247. SEPPÄNEN, supra note 163. For early discussion, see Albert Chen, Toward a Legal
Enlightenment: Discussions in Contemporary China on the Rule of Law, 17 PACIFIC BASIN L.
J. 125, 164 (1999) (“The dogmas of the Marxist orthodoxy as codified by the Soviet and Maoist
states are still alive and well in China.”) For the case of Vietnam, see Thiem H. Bui,
Deconstructing the “Socialist” Rule of Law in Vietnam: The Changing Discourse on Human
Rights in Vietnam’s Constitutional Reform Process, 36 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 77 (2014).
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legal system from other modern legal systems. To be sure, absolute
power or single-party system is not distinctive to socialist law. But, in
the socialist legal system, the communist party is not a private
organization separate from the state created to compete for power
through free and equal elections: it is essential component of the legal
structure and dominates all aspects of the state and the society with
party departments created from the central to the communal levels.248
Socialist law in China and Vietnam cannot be conceptualized without
the consideration of the essential role of the communist party in the
legal system.
The state institutions in China and Vietnam also have distinctive
features. To be sure, like many other countries, these countries also
have three fundamental state powers, legislature, executive, and
judiciary, practiced by different state branches. However, the
arrangement of these institutions is different due to the fact that they
are underlined by different constitutional jurisprudences. This
arrangement is characterized by the supreme position of the legislature
and the subordinate positions of other institutions. This formal
arrangement is underpinned by the principle of “democratic
centralism.” Within that arrangement, the legislature is not merely an
ordinary legislature as in western civil or common law countries. It is
both the constitution-making and law-making bodies. It has both
constituent power and constituted powers. In terms of constituted
powers, it has not only the legislative power, but also other powers that
may be practiced by other institutions in civil law and common law
countries, such as the power to review the constitutionality of the law
(including its law and regulations issued by other state institutions).
Other state institutions are constitutionally required to report to the
legislature and have no institutional means to challenge it, such as veto,
dissolution, or judicial review. This arrangement must be distinguished
with the commonwealth model of parliamentary supremacy
underpinned by a different concept of sovereignty in which the

248. Backer Larry Catá, Party, People, Government, And State: On Constitutional Values
And The Legitimacy of The Chinese State-Party Rule of Law System, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 331,
342 2012 (“the party as the polity”). For the case of Vietnam, see Tuong Vu, The Revolutionary
Path to State Formation in Vietnam: Opportunities, Conundrums, and Legacies, 11 J. VIET.
STUD. 267 (2016) (arguing that “the [communist] party’s radical ideology and practices shaped
the path of state formation by creating particular opportunities and conundrums in five key
aspects of state formation: legitimization, establishing sovereignty, territorialization, creating a
centralized bureaucracy, and monopolizing violence.”).
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executive can dissolve the parliament and the courts can have the weak
judicial review power.249
In addition, the courts system in the socialist legal structure in
China and Vietnam has the distinctive feature: centralization. In
socialist law, “following the Leninist principles of vanguardism and
democratic centralism, courts were seen as extensions of Party control.
Thus, all courts were institutionally subordinated to a powerful
Supreme Court with vast power to control the work of lower courts and
‘articulate judicial policy.’”250 Partlett and Ip indicate that this feature
“has not faded away” in China. 251 More specifically, “like Soviet
courts, Chinese courts were centralized supervisory institutions
entrusted with the responsibility to promote the Party’s ideology and
agenda.”252 Courts in Vietnam have similar feature. The Law on
Organization of People’s Courts of 2014 is enacted, among other
things, “to institutionalize the Party’s guidelines and viewpoints on
judicial reform.”253 The Law establishes one of the chief functions of
the courts as to protect “the socialist regime.”254 The Law also creates
a centralized judicial system. Accordingly, the supreme people’s court
is vested with the powers: (1) to supervise the adjudicating work of
other courts, except cases prescribed by a law; (2) To make overall
assessment of adjudicating practices of courts, ensuring the uniform
application of law in trial; (3) to train and retrain judges, assessors and
other staffs of people’s courts; (4) to manage people’s courts and
military courts organizationally in accordance with this Law and
relevant laws, ensuring independence of courts from one another; and
(5) to submit to the National Assembly draft laws and resolutions; to
submit to the National Assembly Standing Committee draft ordinances
and resolutions in accordance with law.255
The structure of the socialist legal system in China and Vietnam
is also characterized by the Leninist-style institution called procuracy.
249. See generally, STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2012).
250. Partlett & Ip, supra note 102, at 502.
251. Id. at 503.
252. Id. For more details on the relationship between the communist party and courts in
China, see Ling Li, The Chinese Communist Party and The People’s Courts: Judicial
Independence in China, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 37 (2016).
253. VNL_KH1, Salient Points of The New Law on Courts, VIETNAM LAW AND LEGAL
FORUM MAGAZINE (Feb. 6, 2015), http://vietnamlawmagazine.vn/salient-points-of-the-newlaw-on-courts-4009.html [https://perma.cc/B59M-CF4C] (archived Oct. 29, 2017).
254. LAW ON ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE’S COURTS (2014) (Viet.), art. 2.
255. Id., art. 20.
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Lenin designed this institution to implement the principle of “socialist
legality”: strict and unanimous application of the law of the central
government by the lower level state institutions and citizens. 256 In the
legal structure in China and Vietnam, the procuracy remains the fourth
branch of the state, not a component of the executive or the judiciary,
organized from the central to the local levels.257 However, their
functions are narrower than in the original version: they practice public
prosecution, and only supervise judicial procedures and activities.258
While the former function is similar to the prosecutions in other legal
systems, the later function is distinctive to the socialist legal system,
reflecting the Leninist legacy.
We are now in a position to consider the substance of socialist
law. To be sure, the sources of legal rules and norms in China and
Vietnam include codes and legislations like in many civil law countries.
The two countries have also begun to develop case-law like common
law countries. But, one of most important features of the legal rules in
the socialist legal systems in China and Vietnam is their sources
contained in a huge amount of administrative regulations issued by
different institutions and with different titles. In China, in addition to
the constitution, the sources of Chinese law, as stipulated in the
Legislation Law, include: “the law (Falu) enacted by the NPC;
administrative regulations (Tiaoli, Guiding or Banfa) enacted by the
State Council (central government); administrative rules (Guizhang)
enacted by the State Council organs; local regulation enacted by the
local People’s Congress (Di Fang Tiaoli); and local rules (Guizhang)
enacted by local governments.”259
In a similar vein, the Law on Enactment of Normative Legal
Documents lists the following sources of Vietnamese law:
1. The Constitution.

256. See generally, Stephen Holmes, The Procuracy and Its Problems: Introduction, 8 E.
EUR. CONST. REV. 76 (1999).
257. For the case of China, see Partlett & Ip, supra note 102, at 498-501. For the case of
Vietnam, see Pham Lan Phuong, The Procuracy as a Subject of Constitutional Debate:
Controversial and Unresolved Issues, 11 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 309 (2016).
258. For more details, see Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorates of the People’s
Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cont., Sept. 2, 1983),
art. 4; Law on Organization of the People’s Procuracies, art. 2 (Nov. 24, 2014) (Viet.).
259. Qianlan Wu, How has China Formed Its Conception of The Rule of Law? A
Contextual Analysis of Legal Instrumentalism in ROC And PRC Law-Making, INT’L J. L. IN
CONTEXT 5 (2017).
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2. Codes and Laws (hereinafter referred to as Laws), Resolutions
of the National Assembly
3. Ordinances, Resolutions of Standing Committee of the National
Assembly; Joint Resolutions between Standing Committee of the
National Assembly and Management Board of Central Committee
of Vietnamese Fatherland Front
4. Orders, Decisions of the President.
5. Decrees of the Government; Joint Resolutions between the
Government and Management Board of Central Committee of
Vietnamese Fatherland Front
6. Decision of the Prime Minister.
7. Resolutions of Judge Council of the People’s Supreme Court.
8. Circulars of executive judge of the People’s Supreme Court;
Circulars of the Chief Procurator of the Supreme People’s
Procuracy; Circulars of Ministers, Heads of ministerial agencies;
Joint Circulars between executive judge of the People’s Supreme
Court and the Chief Procurator of the Supreme People’s
Procuracy; Joint Circulars between Ministers, Heads of ministerial
agencies and executive judge of the People’s Supreme Court, the
Chief Procurator of the
9. Supreme People’s Procuracy; Decisions of State Auditor
General.
10. Resolutions of the People’s Councils of central affiliated cities
and provinces (hereinafter referred to as provinces).
11. Decisions of the People’s Committees of provinces.
12. Legislative documents of local governments in administrative
economic units.
13. Resolutions of the People’s Councils of districts, towns and
cities within provinces (hereinafter referred to as districts).
14. Decisions of the People’s Committees of districts.
15. Resolutions of the People’s Councils of communes, wards and
towns within districts (hereinafter referred to as communes)
16. Decisions of the People’s Committees of communes.260

This feature of legal source is due both to the practical need to
govern the emerging market and changing society and to the
260. Law on Enactment of Normative Legal Documents, No. 80/2015/QH13 art. 4 (Nov.
25, 2015) (Viet.).
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jurisprudential reason concerning Marxist legal positivism. These legal
instruments play an important role in the socialist legal system in
Vietnam: these regulations are essential to the implementation of the
constitutions, codes, and legislations. The latter do not have the direct
effect to the society like the former. So, different from civil and
common law systems, in the socialist legal system, the constitution and
legislations are enforced mainly not by court’s judicial decisions but by
administrative regulations.
Another feature of socialist legal rules and norms is that they can
be found even in the documents of the communist party. As the
communist party is the essential component of the legal structure, its
documents are not purely political but also include norms or even rules
that have the weight of legal effects. The communist party in China and
Vietnam, through national congresses, the central committee, and the
Politburo, often issue documents which decide on consequential
national issues, and provide the guidance for socioeconomic, legal and
political developments. The party conclusions and guidance are not
optional but authoritative to the state actions. The state bodies cannot
in general reverse what has been decided by the party. For example, the
opening policy for economic reform in both China and Vietnam was
decided by the communist party and then was translated into
constitutions and law.261 With this definitive effect, the party’s
documents can be considered having legal weight in certain
circumstances. In this regard, the Communist Party of China’s Central
Committee’s Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in
Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the Law
is the authoritative legal source. The Communist Party of Vietnam’s
Politburo’s Conclusion No.01-Kl/Tw on The Continued
Implementation of The Strategy for Legal Reform from 2016 to 2020
has similar legal significance.
The contents of legal rules in socialist law include issues similar
to the law of common law and civil law countries. But, socialist law
does not adopt the distinction between “public law” and “private law”
as in other legal systems. Instead, legal rules and norms in socialist law
are grouped under the rubric called “branch of law.” In the Soviet legal
jurisprudence, “a ‘branch of law’ is understood as the aggregate of legal

261. For China, see, Chen, supra note 146, at 60. For Vietnam, see Tran Thanh Huong &
Duong Anh Son, Economic Development and Constitutional Reform in Vietnam” in 3
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN SE. ASIA 311(Clauspeter Hill & Jörg Menzel eds., 2008).
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norms regulating relations in a particular sphere (branch) of social
life”.262 The concept of “branch of law” has still informed the socialist
legal system in China and Vietnam. For example, in China’s
Whitepaper on its legal system refers to “branches of the socialist
system of laws with Chinese characteristics”.263 Accordingly, “the
socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics is an organic
integration of the related laws of the Constitution, civil and commercial
laws, administrative laws, economic laws, social laws, criminal laws,
litigation and non-litigation procedural laws, and other legal branches,
with the Constitution in the supreme place, the laws as the main body,
and administrative and local regulations as the major components.”264
Similarly, the concept of “branch of law” remains dominant in
Vietnam. In law-making, a legislation is normally started by
identifying the particular sphere of social life that the legislation will
regulate.265 The division of the “branch of law” also affects legal
education. Vietnamese textbooks on “general theory on law and state”
clearly define the concept of “branch of law,” its components
(including “scope of regulation” and “method of regulation”), and
introduce fundamental branches of law in the Vietnamese legal system,
including: state law or constitutional law, administrative law, financial
law, land law, civil law, labor law, marriage and family law, criminal
law, criminal procedure law, civil procedure law, economic law, and
international law).266 Even the structure of law schools in Vietnam is
also organized according to the concept of “branch of law” following
the soviet-style. Therefore, the law schools are divided into certain
“departments” consistent with the branches of law.267
Finally, let us consider legal culture. Unlike rules and structures,
legal culture need time to establish. There may not be a well262. Harold J. Berman, Legal System, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAW 477 (F.J.M.
Feldbrugge et al. eds. 1985).
263. STATE COUNCIL WHITE PAPER, supra note 123.
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., Criminal Code, No. 100/2015/QH13 art. 1 (Nov. 27, 2015) (“This Code
regulates crimes and punishments.”) (Viet.).
266. See, e.g., GIÁO TRÌNH LÝ LUẬN NHÀ NƯỚC VÀ PHÁP LUẬT [TEXTBOOK ON
GENERAL THEORY ON LAW AND STATE] (Lê Minh Tâm ed. 2009).
267. For example, the School of Law at Vietnam National University-Hanoi is comprised
of these six departments: Department of Theory and History of State and Law; Department of
Constitution and Administration; Department of Criminal Law; Department of Civil Law;
Department of Business Law; and Department of International Law. See School of Law,
VIETNAM NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, HANOI, http://www.vnu.edu.vn/eng/?C2247/N12718/page1
[https://perma.cc/Z7C4-9D6P] (last visited Oct. 10, 2017).
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established socialist legal culture in China and Vietnam. However,
some features of legal culture of socialist law have germinated in China
and Vietnam. At least, two emerging cultures can be observed, which
can be called: the regulatory culture and the bureaucratic culture. First,
the regulatory culture indicates a strong tendency among the state
agencies to regulate the society as a top-down, interventional process.
To be sure, regulation is not distinctive to the socialist legal system.268
However, socialist law, as evident in China and Vietnam, has a heavy
concern on the state’s regulatory intervention on nearly all corners of
the society, ranging from the way to organize the public power to the
way to wear clothes.269 Among other purposes (eg., economic
development), this socialist regulation is meant to direct people’s
behaviors towards the culture and goals that the state favor. The second
culture is bureaucratic. In this regard, legal and administrative process
in socialist law heavily requires multi-steps of procedures. This is not
merely a technical issue. The heavy concern of multi-staged procedures
is to make sure that the party and the state can meticulously control the
society and people’s behavior to achieve their goals.
IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A BETTER PLACE IN
COMPARATIVE LAW
I conclude with further reflections on possible contributions of the
study of law in China and Vietnam to traditional comparative law, postmodern comparative law, and global comparative law.270
To begin with, the study of the law of China and Vietnam can
enrich traditional comparative law. As Siems writes, “the disregard of
non-western countries by traditional comparative law is more difficult
to excuse.”271 The study of law in China and Vietnam can avoid such
excuse. Moreover, the diversity of law in the legal history of China and
Vietnam cast doubt on the functionalist approach in traditional
comparative law which tends to overemphasis the common legal

268. See generally, BRONWEN MORGAN & KAREN YEUNG, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW
(2007).
269. See e.g. Decree on Penalties for Administrative Violations Pertaining to Culture,
Sports, Tourism and Advertising, No. 158/2013/NĐ-CP, art. 13 (Nov. 12, 2013) (imposing
administrative punishment on models who wear clothes in consistent with Vietnamese culture
in their performance) (Viet.).
270. I adopt these three dimensions of comparative law from SIEMS, supra note 12, at 9.
271. Id. at 36.
AND REGULATION
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features.272 In addition, the study of law in China and Vietnam can
rectify some mistakes in classification of legal systems in traditional
comparative law. It is simplistic to group law in China under a single
rubric, like “Chinese Law”273 or “Chinese legal tradition.”274 There are
different legal systems in China and Vietnam, and these legal systems
play the dominant role in different period of time. The traditional
taxonomy of legal systems can be enriched by the addition of two
distinctive legal systems, namely the Confucian legal system and the
socialist legal system. Moreover, the study of these legal systems is
important for understanding legal history and contemporary law not
only in China and Vietnam but also in other countries and jurisdictions
whose traditional law and modern law are influenced by these legal
systems. To illustrate, Confucian law also influenced legal history and
even modern law in Japan and Korea.275 Vestiges of Confucian legal
culture can also be found in Singapore276 and Hong Kong.277 Socialist
law is also adopted and has recently experienced different levels of
change in three other contemporary socialist countries, namely Laos,278
North Korea,279 and Cuba.280 Finally, the addition of the Confucian
legal system and the socialist legal system can enrich comparative legal
systems. Confucian law can be compared with other traditional legal
systems (e.g., Islamic law, Hindu law, and Buddhist law),281 while

272. For functionalism, see KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 34 (1998).
273. Id. at 286.
274. JOHN W. HEAD, GREAT LEGAL TRADITIONS: CIVIL LAW, COMMON LAW, AND
CHINESE LAW IN HISTORICAL AND OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 458 (2011).
275. CONFUCIANISM, LAW, AND DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY KOREA (Sungmoon
Kim ed. 2015); Chaihark Halm, Law, Culture and the Politics of Confucianism, 16 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 253 (2003); Woo-jung Joon, The Influence of Confucianism on the Criminal Laws of
Korea and Japan, 9 KOR. U. L. REV. 21 (2013).
276. M Chen-Wishart, Legal Transplant of Undue Influence: Lost in Translation or a
Working Misunderstanding? 62 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 1 (2013).
277. Charles K. N. Lam and S. H. Goo, The Intrinsic Value of Confucianism and Its
Relevance to the Legal System in Hong Kong and China, 3 CHINESE J. COMP. L.175 (2015).
278. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS IN LAOS PDR: A
BASELINE STUDY (2015).
279. Eric Yong-Joong Lee, Development of North Korea’s Legal Regime Governing
Foreign Business Cooperation: A Revisit under the New Socialist Constitution of 1998, 21 NW.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 199 (2000-2001).
280. Larry Catá Backer, The Cuban Communist Party at The Center of Political and
Economic Reform: Current Status and Future Reform, 7 NW. IINTERDISC. L. REV. 94 (2015).
281. For other traditional legal systems, see WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A
GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASIA AND AFRICA (2006); WERNER MENSKI,
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socialist law can be compared with other modern legal systems (e.g.,
civil law and common law).
The study of law in China and Vietnam can also contribute to
post-modern comparative law, which focuses on the way similar legal
words and concepts having different meaning in different legal
systems.282 Throughout its history, law in China and Vietnam is
apparently not autonomous. Their law is not merely controlled by
professional lawyers but is understood and practiced in its complex
relationship with contextual factors. Therefore, China and Vietnam
provide rich data for post-modernist comparative studies of: law and
ideology, law and politics, law and culture, law and society, and legal
pluralism.
Finally, global comparative law can greatly benefit from
exploring law in China and Vietnam. These countries provide rich data
for the study of legal transplants and global legal diffusion. Confucian
law was transplanted cross East Asian traditional societies, and this
deserves a comparative study. The transplants of civil law and socialist
law in China and Vietnam further provide a laboratory for comparative
examination of legal transplants. Moreover, the fact that China and
Vietnam are now global actors and vehemently borrowed global law
provide significant data for study of legal global diffusion. Last but not
least, the global revival of the “law and development” movement283 is
resonated in the two countries.284 While some are optimistic about the
role of law in fostering economic development, others are frustrated
about reality.285 Economic development in China and Vietnam in the
last three decades has occurred in tandem with legal reform. Whether
there is connection between the legal reform and the economic reform
deserves further comparative legal studies.

HINDU LAW: BEYOND TRADITION AND MODERNITY (2003); ANDREW HUXLEY, THAI LAW:
BUDDHIST LAW: ESSAYS ON THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THAILAND, LAOS AND BURMA (1996).
282. SIEMS, supra note 12, at 5.
283. For the evolution of law and development movement, see Michael Trebilcock, Law
and Development: Forty Years after ‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement’ 66 UNIV. OF TORONTO L.
J. 301 (2016); Michael Trebilcock, Between Universalism and Relativism: Reflections on the
Evolution pf Law and Development Studies, 66 UNIV. OF TORONTO L. J. 330 (2016).
284. GUANGHUA YU, RETHINKING LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE
(2013); LAW AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE GLOBAL DISCOURSE OF LEGAL TRANSFERS (John
Gillespie & Pip Nicholson eds., 2012).
285. Benjamin van Rooji & Pip Nicholson, Inflationary Trends in Law and Development,
24 DUKE J. COMP & INT’L L. 297-348 (2013).
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APPENDIX

Figure 1: Number of Regulation in Post-Doi Moi : 1987-2016
Source: Author's Creation from Thu Vien Phap Luat (Law Library)
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Figure 2: Number of Regulation by Area: 1987-2016
Source: Author's Creation from thu vien phap luat (law
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Figure 3: Type of Regulation: 1987-2016
Source: Author's Creation from Thu Vien Phap Luat (Law Library)
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Figure 4: Ministry-Level Regulation: 1987-2016
Source: Author's Creation from Thu Vien Phap Luat (Law
Library)
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Figure 5: Regulations by Provinces: 1987-2016
Source: Author's Creation from Thu vien Phap luat (Law
Library)
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